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ON THE INTENTIONALITY AND IMPERFECT BUT MINIMAL RATIONALITY OF HUMAN SPEAKERS
https://doi.org/10.18956/00007733
https://doi.org/10.18956/00007733c6ebee30-75c0-4074-82f1-5ff8e84f6058
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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Item type | 本学紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||||
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公開日 | 2017-04-01 | |||||||
タイトル | ||||||||
タイトル | ON THE INTENTIONALITY AND IMPERFECT BUT MINIMAL RATIONALITY OF HUMAN SPEAKERS | |||||||
言語 | en | |||||||
言語 | ||||||||
言語 | eng | |||||||
作成者 |
Vanderveken, Daniel
× Vanderveken, Daniel
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作成者所属(英) | ||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||
値 | Université du Québec, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte | |||||||
抄録 | ||||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||
内容記述 | I will criticize the current logical analysis of attitudes due to J. Hintikka (1971) according to which human agents are either perfectly rational or completely irrational. I will present the principles of a general logic of first level attitudes and actions that accounts for our intentionality and imperfect but minimal rationality. First level attitudes and actions are attitudes and actions of individual agents at a single moment of time. In my approach psychological modes of propositional attitudes have other components than their basic Cartesian category of cognition and volition. I will formulate a recursive definition of the set of all psychological modes. I will also analyze the nature of complex first level attitudes such as conditional attitudes and sums and denegations of attitudes which are irreducible to propositional attitudes. My primary purpose here will be first to explicate inductively conditions of possession and of satisfaction of all first level attitudes and to integrate my logic of attitudes within a general theory of first level actions explicating the primacy of intentional actions, their conditions of success and fundamental laws of action generation. For that purpose I will use a non classical predicative propositional logic and consider subjective as well as objective possibilities. Agents of voluntary actions and illocutionary acts have intentions and other first level attitudes. I will explain why logically equivalent propositions are not the content of the same attitudes and intentional actions and why human agents are neither logically omniscient nor perfectly rational but always remain minimally rational in the exercise of thought and the use of language. For more information see my next book Speech Acts in Dialogue. | |||||||
言語 | en | |||||||
書誌情報 |
en : The Journal of Intercultural Studies 巻 40, p. 1-32, 発行日 2016 |
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出版者 | ||||||||
出版者 | Kansai Gaidai University. Intercultural Research Institute | |||||||
言語 | en | |||||||
ISSN | ||||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | PISSN | |||||||
収録物識別子 | 0388-0508 | |||||||
NCID | ||||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||||
収録物識別子 | AA00252610 | |||||||
資源タイプ | ||||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||
資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||||
アクセス権 | ||||||||
アクセス権 | open access | |||||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||||
論文のバージョン | ||||||||
出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||
ID登録 | ||||||||
ID登録 | 10.18956/00007733 | |||||||
ID登録タイプ | JaLC | |||||||
表示順 | ||||||||
値 | 1 |