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THE INDIAN BUDDHIST PERCEPTION-THEORY IN TATTVASAṂGRAHA AND ITS PAÑĪKĀ : SOME CORRECTIONS AND REVISED TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT CHAPTER 17 (1)

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I. Introduction

The aim of this article is to make some corrections to the Sanskrit text and to revise the translation of Indian Buddhist Philosophy book *Tattvasaṁgraha's* (TS) 17th chapter and its commentary (Pañjikā; TSP)¹. This book is written by Śāntarakṣita (ca.725-788) and his disciple Kamalaśīla (ca.740-795) who both belong to Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school. In this chapter (kk.1212-1360²), they mainly deal with direct perception's (*pratyakṣa*) non-conceptuality and non-erroneousness defined by Buddhist scholar Dharmakīrti (ca. 600-660)³, and in the part kk.1264-1284, they defend the direct perception's non-conceptuality - which Śāntarakṣita has demonstrated up to kk.1263 - against a Jainist's criticism. So as to refute the Jainist's theory of direct perception, Śāntarakṣita cites Digambara school scholar Sumati in this part. Sumati maintains the existence of two kinds of direct perception, in other words, non-conceptual direct perception and conceptual direct perception, then argues that the former arises to the universal of high degree which is contained in a real entity (*vastu*) and the latter arises to the universal of low degree and the particular. Against this, from the viewpoint that direct perception of individual things is precisely non-conceptual, Śāntarakṣita replies that because the universal has a relationship of mutual exclusion (*anyonyaparihāra*) with the particular, on the contrary, it follows that the universal can be grasped

¹ In order to correct the text and revise the translation of *Tattvasaṁgraha's* 17th chapter, I have had great instruction from Professor Motoi Ono (University of Tsukuba). And I got great advice from Associate Professor Taisei Shida, post-graduate students of University of Tsukuba and Ms. Mai Miyo (JSPS research fellow). For translating this article, Professor Liana Trufas (Nanzan University) helped me to correct my English and gave me useful suggestions. I would like to express heartfelt gratitude here.

² In this article, kārikā number of TS and page number of TSP are based on B unless otherwise indicated.

³ Whether the direct perception is free from conceptual construction or not has been the subject of many and heated debates among the scholars of Indian thought. In this dispute, Grammarians (*Vaiyākaraṇa*) maintain direct perception's conceptuality, while *Mīmāṃsakas* and *Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣikas* maintain that there are two kinds of direct perception: conceptual and non-conceptual. Those schools who take this position accept the existence of the universals other than individual things as the external entity which brings about certain notion. Against this, Buddhists maintain the direct perception's non-conceptuality on account of the fact that the universal is a subjective conceptual thing and not experienced by perception.

by conceptual cognition.

This controversy has already been introduced by Dr. Masaaki Hattori; at the time of his research, neither the background of Sumati's thought nor Dharmakīrti's doctrine which Śāntarakṣita used for his answer was clear. However, later studies have brought new information about the master-disciple lineage of Jainist order, epistemology of Jainism and Dharmakīrti's doctrine. As I had already reported the background of Sumati's thought and the answers from Buddhist side in my article published in this year (Kaneko[2019a], *ibid.*[2019b]), by showing corrected text and revised translation based on manuscripts I make Sumati and Śāntarakṣita's dispute clear in this article. This time I introduce only the first half part which corresponds to synopsis (1)-(2).

Synopsis:

(1) kk.1264-1269

Sumati's objection: Non-conceptual direct perception grasps the universal such as Being itself (*sattā*) and conceptual direct perception grasps the universal such as cowness (*gotva*) and the particular. On the contrary, Kumāriḷa of Mīmāṃsaka school thinks that direct perception grasps individual things. But the cognition which grasps the qualified object is conceptual.

(2) kk.1270-1274

Buddhists' answer: Direct perception grasps a particular individual thing by excluding it from homogeneous and heterogeneous things. Consequently, because each individual things are not qualified by qualifier, the direct perception which grasps them is non-conceptual. On the other hand, because the universal is distinguished from the particular, it can be grasped by conceptual cognition.

(3) kk.1275-1276

Sumati's objection: The universal cannot ontologically be distinguished from the particular, because grasping the universal is the same as grasping plural individual things. And as individual things are cognized in terms of similarity and dissimilarity, the existence of the universal and the particular are established.

(4) kk.1277-1280

Buddhists' answer: The universal and the particular are established by mutual exclusion. Then the universal and the particular are not grasped by distinct cognitions but by conceptual cognition together.

(5) kk.1281-1283

Buddhists' answer: The universal is subjective conceptual thing, but is distinguished from fictitious thing equivalent to non-being.

(6) kk.1284

Conclusion of this part: Cognition with regard to individual things is non-conceptual.

The principle of correction and revise.

The principle of correction and revise is as follows:

(1) Based on the passages of two manuscripts, i.e. Jaisalmer (J) and Paṭṭan (Pt)¹, if there are some errors in Gaekwad (G) and Bauddha Bharati (B) editions, I make their corrections. In the case there seem to be some questionable points in one or another of manuscripts and edited texts, I follow Tibetan translations.

(2) I use sDe dGe (D) and Peking (P) editions about Tibetan translation. I put ahead the grammatically appropriate reading ahead, and give another one within (). The source locations of Tibetan translation cited in footnotes are based on the numbers of sDe dGe edition.

(3) Marks and Abbreviations:

{ } : Cancellation made by the manuscripts' writers

< > : Margin note of the manuscripts

ins. : Insert of words

lacking in : Lack of words

for : Different translation in Tibetan language

em. : Emendation to the content of manuscripts taking into account the consistency of the context.

I don't note down the differences concerning the kind and location of *shad*, adopting those which seemed to me appropriate.

Orthographic variants (e.g. artha : artha, viśeṣa : viśeṣa, prasaṅga : prasaṅga, ltos : bltos, slu : bslu etc.) are not noted down.

(4) Each paragraph and section number of the text corresponds to synopsis and translation in separate sheets.

II. Tattvasamgraha's 17th Chapter and its Pañjikā

G379 B463 J154a4 Pt180b16 **nanv** ityādi_{b17}nā prathame hetau **sumater digambarasya** matenāsiddhatām² āśānkate.

J64a2 Pt24a10 **nanu nāmādikaṃ mā bhūt tasya grāhyaṃ viśeṣaṇam |**

tathāpy asiddhatā hetor naiva vyāvartate _{a11} **yataḥ**^{3/4} || (1264)

¹ I obtained monochrome version of J and color version of Pt as image data from Professor Hiroshi Nemoto (Hiroshima University). And I obtained color version of J through Ms. Mai Miyo, which was taken by Ms. Hiroko Matsuoka (Hiroshima University) in Jaisalmer temple in India. I express my appreciation to everyone who provided me manuscript data here.

² matenāsi ..ām Pt

³ vyāvartate yataḥ J, G, B : vyāvartate ya yataḥ Pt

⁴ de ni gzung bya'i bye brag las || ming sogs sbyor ba ma yin yang || 'on kyang gtan tshigs ma grub pa || gang gis rjes su 'jug pa min || *for* nanu nāmādikaṃ mā bhūt tasya grāhyaṃ viśeṣaṇam | tathāpy asiddhatā hetor naiva vyāvartate

arthāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇam yadi |

arthamātragraho^{a3} vā syād agraho vā ghaṭe yathā || (1265)

ghaṭāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇam¹ yadi |

ghaṭamātragraho^{a12} vā syād agraho vā ghaṭasya vai || (1266)

sa² hi sāmānyaviśeṣātmakatvenobhayarūpaṃ sarvaṃ vastu varṇayati. sāmānyam ca dvirūpaṃ – viśeṣeṇā^{Pt181a1}vacchinnam³ yathā gotvādi, anavacchinnam yathā sattāvastutvādi. tatra yad anavacchinnam ekarūpaṃ, tad ālocanamātrasya^{4/5} nirvikalpakapratyakṣasya gocaraḥ. itarat punaḥ^{a5} savi^{a2}kalpakasyety eṣā tasya⁶ prakriyā.

kumārilaḥ tu – ālocanaññānam⁷ nirvikalpakam vyaktisvalakṣaṇaviśayaṃ varṇayati. sāmānyaviśayaṃ tu savikalpakam pratyakṣam. ^{a3} tatra **sumatiḥ** **kumārilaḍy**abhimatālocanamātrapratyakṣavicāraṇārtham^{8/9/10} āha¹¹ – B⁴⁶⁴ tadvādidaṃ praṣṭavyaḥ. kiṃ tad indriyasya puraḥsthitam arthamātram svena rūpeṇārthāntarāsam^{a4}bhavinā viśiṣṭam ^{gr}a⁶ghyate, uta neti¹².

yady asau brūyāt – neti, atrocyate – **arthāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇam yadi**¹³ vivakṣitād arthād yad **arthāntaram**¹⁴, tato **vyavacchinnam**, tatrāv^{a5}idyamānam vivakṣitārthastham **rūpaṃ** svabhāvaḥ, tena¹⁵ viśiṣṭasya **yadi** tasyārthasyā**grahaṇam** iṣyate, tad**arthamātragraho**¹⁶ **vā syāt**¹⁷, yat tad **arthamātram** arthāntarāsambhavi svabhāvara^{a6}hitam, tasyaiva grahaṇam **syāt**. atha tad api na ^{J154b1}grhyate, tadā **agraho vā**, agrahaṇam eva **syāt**.

ghaṭe yatheti nidarśanam uktam, tac chlokāntareṇa vyācāṣṭe – **ghaṭāntaretyādi**. avadhī^{a7}krtaghaṭāsambhavinā **rūpeṇa yadi** tasya ghaṭasyā**grahaṇam**, tadā **ghaṭamātragraho vā syāt**, kena cid rājatatāmṛdīnā viśeṣeṇā^{a8}viśiṣṭasya **ghaṭamātrasya** grahaṇam **syāt**. ^{a8} atha¹⁸ **ghaṭamātrasyāpi** grahaṇam na bhavati, tadā kasya cid apy abhimatasyāpi na ^{b2}grahaṇam **syād** ity **agraho vā ghaṭasya vai**. evam atrāpi dārṣṭāntike viśeṣāgrahaṇe ^{a9}rthamātragrahaṇam agrahaṇam¹⁹ vā **syād** ity ekāntaḥ.

yataḥ || T46b6-7

¹ ghaṭāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇam J, Pt, G : ghaṭāntara vyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇam B

² <sumatiḥ> = sa J, Pt margin note

³ khyab par for viśeṣeṇa T9a3

⁴ ālocana° em. B : ālocanā° J, Pt, G

⁵ e... .. ālocanā° Pt

⁶ de dag gi for tasya T9a4

⁷ ālocana° em. B : ālocanā° J, Pt, G

⁸ legs pa'i blo gros dang gzhan nu ma len la sogs pas for sumatiḥ kumārilaḍy T9a5

⁹ ālocana° em. B : ālocanā° J, Pt, G

¹⁰ dgag pa for vicāraṇā° T9a5

¹¹ ins. gal te don gzhan zhes bya ba la sogs pa T9a5

¹² uta neti J, Pt, B : neti G

¹³ <sautram padam idam> = arthāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇam yadi J, Pt margin note

¹⁴ brjod par 'dod pa'i don gzhan gang yin pa for vivakṣitād arthād yad arthāntaram T9a7

¹⁵ tena lacking in T

¹⁶ tadāntarāmātra° J, Pt (cf. de'i tsho don tsam T9a7) : tadā tadarthamātra° G, B

¹⁷ <idam api sautram padam> = °arthamātragraho vā syāt J, Pt margin note

¹⁸ atha J, Pt, B : atha lacking in G

¹⁹ 'rthamātragrahaṇam agrahaṇam J : 'rthamātragrahaṇam na grahaṇam Pt, G, B

atha pūrvakah pakṣaḥ, atrāha – grāhyāntaretyādi¹.

grāhyāntaravyavacchinnabhāvena² grāhi cen matam |
savikalpa⁴kavijñānaṃ bhaved vṛkṣādibodhavat || (1267)

G380 yadi paratrāsambhavinā svarūpeṇa viśiṣṭārthagrahīna¹⁰driyajñānam abhipretam³, tadā savikalpaṃ⁴ prāpnoti, kena cid rūpeṇa viśiṣṭārthagrahītvād vṛkṣo 'yam ityādibodhavat.

syān matam⁵ – nārthamātram⁶ nāma kiṃ b_{3/a11} cid asti, yat⁷ svarūpeṇa viśiṣya⁸ grhyate. kiṃ tarhi yat tad viśiṣṭam rūpaṃ tava mama⁹ viśeṣābhimatam, tad evāsti grhyate B₄₆₅ ceti. ata āha¹⁰ – viśeṣo¹¹ 'sprṣṭasā¹²mānyo¹² na ca¹³ kaś cana vidyata iti.

viśeṣo 'sprṣṭasāmānyo na ca kaś cana vi^{a13}dyate |
grahaṇe cet tadasprṣṭam¹⁴ vibhāvātvaṇ na grhyate¹⁵ || (1268)

arthamātram¹⁶ nāma sāmānyam ucyate, yat tat sattety ākhyāyate. tannirapekṣo¹⁷ na kaś cid viśeṣo vidyate, yo grhyeta¹⁸. tatraitat syā^{a13t} – tvanmatyā yady api tad asti sāmānyam, graha^{b4}ṇakāle tu tan na sprṣyata ity āha¹⁹ – grahaṇe cet tadasprṣṭam²⁰ vibhāvātvaṇ na grhyata iti. grahaṇakāle yadi tat sāmānyam²¹ sattākhyam in^{a14}driyajñānena na sprṣyate viśeṣamātram eva grhyate, tadā tad viśeṣamātram grhyamānaṃ bhāvarahitam sattākhyam²² svabhāvavikalpaṃ²³ niḥsvabhāvaṃ prāptam iti nendriyajñānagrā^{a15}hyaṃ syāt, vibhāvātvaṇ vigatabhāvātvaṇ vīyatpuṣpa^{b5}vad iti.

viśiṣṭaviśayo bodhaḥ kalpanā neti sāhasam |
a⁵ na viśeṣaṇasambandhād rte vaiśiṣṭyasambhavaḥ || (1269)

tasmād viśiṣṭaviśayo bodho 'tha ca kalpanā nāstīti sāhasam etad bhavatāṃ pramāṇabādhitam abhyu^{a16}pagacchatām ity upasaṃhāraḥ. atraivopapattim āha – na viśeṣaṇetyādi. na hi daṇḍasambandham antareṇa tadvān bhavati, tadvad viśiṣṭo 'pi viśeṣaṇasambandham²⁴ antareṇa na yukta^{a17} iti bhāvaḥ. tasmād yad viśeṣaṇasambandhagrahaṇam, tat savikalpakam iti.

¹ grāhyāntare° J, G, B : grāhyantare° Pt

² vyavacchinna° J, Pt (cf. rnam bead pa'i T47a1) : vyavacchinnaṃ G, B

³ abhipretam J, G, B (cf. 'dod na T9b4) : anabhipretam Pt

⁴ savikalpaṃ J, Pt : savikalpakam G, B

⁵ <kumārilasya> = syān matam J, Pt margin note; kumārilasyedaṃ matam B

⁶ ... ātram Pt

⁷ yat J, G, B (cf. gang zhig T9b5) : tat Pt

⁸ viśiṣya em. G, B : viśeṣya J, Pt

⁹ mama lacking in T

¹⁰ <sumatiḥ> = āha J, Pt margin note; sumatir iti śeṣaḥ B

¹¹ ... e s. Pt

¹² asprṣṭa° J, Pt (cf. reg pa ma yin pa'i T9b6) : aspaṣṭa° G, B

¹³ na ca J, G, B : na ca na ca Pt

¹⁴ °asprṣṭam J, Pt (cf. ma reg pas T47a2) : °aspaṣṭam G, B

¹⁵ ins. de phyr nam mkha'i me tog bzhin || dngos med 'di na'ang gzung ba (D : ba lacking in P) min || T47a2

¹⁶ arthamātram J (cf. don tsam T9b6) : atra mātram Pt, G, B

¹⁷ gzung bar bya ba de la ltos pa med pa'i for tannirapekṣo T9b7

¹⁸ grhyeta J, Pt, G : grhyate B

¹⁹ <sumatiḥ> = āha J, Pt margin note

²⁰ °asprṣṭam J, Pt (cf. ma reg T9b7) : °aspaṣṭam G, B

²¹ phyr for sāmānyam T10a1

²² sattākhyam Pt : sattākhyā° J, G, B

²³ stong pa for vikalam T10a1

²⁴ viśeṣaṇasambandham em. (cf. viśeṣaṇasambandhād TS1269'c) : viśeṣasambandham J, Pt, G, B

b₆ prayogaḥ – vivādāspadībhūtaṃ **viśiṣṭaviṣayaṃ** jñānaṃ savikalpakam, **viśiṣṭaviṣayatvāt** paṭo¹
Pt181b1yam ityādi jñānavad iti.

sajātīyetyādinā pratividhatte².

sajātīyavi_{a14}jātīyavyāvṛttārthagrahān mataḥ |

viśiṣṭaviṣayo bodho na viśeṣaṇasaṅgateḥ || (1270)

tad³ atra yadī vyatiriktaviśeṣaṇasambandhād^{4/5} viśiṣṭaviṣayatvād iti hetvarthaḥ, tadā na siddho
hetuḥ. ta_{b2}thā hi – na **bau_{J155a1}ddhasya** viśeṣaṇaṃ nāma kiṃ cid asti, yena
tatsa_{G381}mbandhagrahaṇād **viśiṣṭaviṣayo** B₄₆₆ **bodhaḥ** syāt. kiṃ tarhi **sajātīyavijātīyebhyo**
vyāvṛttasārthamātrasya gra_{a3}hād grahaṇān **mato** iṣṭaḥ⁶ **viśiṣṭaviṣayo bodhaḥ**.

kathaṃ tarhi viśiṣṭatvam asya. vaiśiṣṭyam asyetyādi vyapadeśo vyatirekīvety⁷ āha – **bhedo**
ityādi.

bhedo vaiśiṣṭyam uktaṃ hi na viśeṣa_{a6}ṇasaṅgatiḥ⁸ |

bhinnam ity api tad vācā nānuvi_{a15}ddhaṃ pratīyate || (1271)

bhedāḥ sajātī_{b4}yavijātīyebhyo⁹ vyāvṛtīḥ. sā ca nānyā vyāvṛttād bhāvāt¹⁰. bhāva eva hi a₂
bhedāntarapatikṣepeṇa tanmātra_{J11}jñāsāyām tathocyate.

syād etat – yadī vijātīyasajātīyeb_{b5}byo bhinnasya vastuno grahaṇam, niyamena tarhi
savikalpakam grahaṇam prāptam, bhinnam etad ity evamākārapravṛttatvāt. anyathā kathaṃ
tadviṣayaṃ syāt, yady anyākāra_{b6}pravṛttaṃ bhavet. na hy anyākārapravṛttaṃ tadviṣayaṃ yuktaṃ
atiprasaṅgād ity āśaṅkyāha – **bhinnam ity api tad** i_{a3}tyādi.

kathaṃ tarhi bhinnam ity abhidhīyata ity āha – **svabhāvāpa_{b7}retyādi**.

svabhāvāparaniḥśeṣapadārthavyatireki_{J64b1}ṇi |

gr̥hīte sati tasmīms tu vikalpo jāyate tathā || (1272)

svabhāvād apare ye niḥśeṣāḥ padārthāḥ, tebhyo **vyatirekiṇi** vyāvṛtte **gr̥hīte sati**¹¹,
asādhāraṇanīlādya_{kārapratibhāsanāt} paścād¹² bhedādhyavasāyī¹³ b₈ śabdākārānusyūto¹⁴ bhinnam
ity abhilapann utpadyate **vikalpaḥ**¹⁵. na ca vastv¹⁶ abhilāpasvabhāvaṃ tatsaṃsr̥ṣṭātmatvaṃ¹⁷ vā,

¹ bum pa for paṭa T10a4

² <bauddhaḥ> = pratividhatte J, Pt margin note; ācāryaḥ śāntarakṣita iti śeṣaḥ B

³ tad J (cf. de'i phyr T10a5) : yad Pt, G, B

⁴ sambandhāt || J, sambandhād B : sabamdhāt | Pt : sambandhāt (iti) G

⁵ vyatiriktaviśeṣaṇasambandhād for tha dad pa'i phyr khyad par dang 'brel ba las T10a5

⁶ iṣṭaḥ J, B (cf. khas len pa T47a3) : iṣṭaḥ lacking in Pt, G

⁷ tha snyad dang tha dad pa ... yin zhe na for vyapadeśo vyatirekīvety T10a7

⁸ tha dad de yang bye brag can || zhes brjod bye brag 'brel bas min || for bhedo vaiśiṣṭyam uktaṃ hi na viśeṣaṇasaṅgatiḥ | T47a3

⁹ °vijātīyebhyo em. G, B : °vijātīyabhyo J, Pt

¹⁰ bhāvāt lacking in T

¹¹ saty J, G, B : sadha? ty Pt

¹² paścād lacking in T

¹³ paścā... ..yavasāyī Pt

¹⁴ °ānusyūto J, Pt (cf. rjes su byed pa T, śabdākārānusyūta° TSP ad TS128kk, 135kk, 142-143kk) : °ānusmṛto G, B

¹⁵ brjod pa can gyi rnam par rtog pa skye ba yin no for abhilapann utpadyate vikalpaḥ T10b4

¹⁶ na ca vastv J, Pt (cf. dngos po ... kyang ma yin no T10b4-5) : na ced astv G, B

¹⁷ tatsaṃsr̥ṣṭātmatvaṃ em. (cf. de dang ldan pa'i bdag nyid T10b5) : tatsaṃsr̥ṣṭātmatattvaṃ J, Pt, G, B

yena bhinnam ity abhinnam iti¹ nāmnā² a₄ saṃyo_{b9}jya grahaṇe asati, agrhītaṃ³ syāt. tasmā adiddha eva hetuḥ.

atha vyāvṛttivaśād⁴ viśiṣṭa iti kṛtvā viśiṣṭaviśayatvād iti hetvarthaḥ⁵ nārthāntaravib₁₀śeṣaṇasambandhāt, tadāpi svato 'naikāntiko⁶ hetur iti darśayann āha – **viśeṣa**_{B467}ṇetyādi.

viśeṣaṇānavacchinnam^{7/8} paraiḥ sāmānyam iṣyate |

a₁₆ **nirvikalpakavijñānagrāhyam⁹ tatrāpy adah¹⁰ samam || (1273)**

dvirūpaṃ hi **sāmānyam viśeṣaṇā**vacchinnarūpaṃ **anavacchinnā**_{b11}rūpaṃ ca. tatra yad **anavacchinnā**_{a5}rūpaṃ, tan **nirvikalpakavijñānagrāhyam iṣṭam. tatrāpi** – sāmānye **ada¹¹** etadvikalpakavijñānagrāhyatvaṃ tulyam.

G₃₈₂ katham ity āha – **viśeṣād dhi**_{b12}tyādi.

viśeṣād dhi viśiṣṭam tat¹² sāmānyam avagamyate |

tadgrāhakam atah prāptaṃ vijñānam savikalpakam || (1274)

yasmād¹³ **viśeṣād viśiṣṭam** vyāvṛttaṃ **tat sāmānyam¹⁴** pratīyate. anyathā sāmānyam eva na syāt, tato yadi na vyāvarteta¹⁵. tatas cāsyāpi sāmānyasya viśe_{b13}ṣād vyāvṛttasya **grāhakam vijñānam savikalpakam prāpnoti**, a₆ viśiṣṭaviśayatvāt¹⁶. na ca bhavati tvaṃmatena. tasmāt svato 'nekānta¹⁷ iti.

(To be continued)

III. Translation

1.1.1. [Objection:] Sumati's ontology and epistemology.

Through **Sumati's** thought — who belonging to **Digambara school** — expressed by such expressions like "**Isn't it that ...**" etc., [Śāntaraksita] anticipates non-establishment of the first reason

¹ abhinnam iti *lacking in* T

² abhinna ... āmnā Pt

³ saṃyojya grahaṇe asati, agrhītaṃ *em.* (cf. sbyor ba ma bzung (D : gzung P) ba na (D : ni P) mi 'dzin par T10b4) : saṃyojyāgrahaṇe sati agrhītaṃ J : saṃyojyāgrahaṇe satyi grhītaṃ Pt : saṃyojya grahaṇe sati agrhītaṃ B : saṃyojya grahaṇe sati grhītaṃ G

⁴ dogs pa'i *for* vyāvṛtti T10b5

⁵ hetva .thaḥ Pt

⁶ 'naikāntiko *em.* : (a)naikāntiko J, Pt : naikāntiko G, B

⁷ viśeṣaṇānavacchinnam Pt, G, B : viśeṣaṇānav {i}acchinnam J

⁸ bye brag tu ni ma bzung la *for* viśeṣaṇānavacchinnam T47a4

⁹ rtog pa dang bcas shes pa la || 'dzin na *for* nirvikalpakavijñānagrāhyam T47a4

¹⁰ adah J, Pt : atah G, B

¹¹ ada J : ata Pt, G, B

¹² de la *for* tat T47a5

¹³ yasmād J, Pt, B (cf. gang gi phyir T10b7) : yad dhy asmād G

¹⁴ phyir *for* sāmānyam T11a1

¹⁵ vyāvarteta Pt, G, B : vyāvartete J

¹⁶ viśiṣṭa° J, Pt, G : viśiṣṭa° B

¹⁷ nekānta J, Pt : 'naikānta G, B

[which negates the existence of genus etc.]¹.

A qualifier such as name etc. is not something graspable by that [i.e. direct perception], and should it be true [i.e. name etc. could not be graspable by direct perception], [the consequence] isn't it that non-establishment of the reason is inevitable? Because if [one] does not grasp [an object] by excluding it from the other objects, it follows that [one] or grasps the object itself or does not grasp at all. For example in the case of a pot, if [one] does not grasp [the pot] by excluding it from the other pots, it follows that [one] or grasps the pot itself or does not grasp it at all. (1264-66)

In other words, he [i.e. Sumati²] explains that all real entities have two essences in the sense that they possess both the universal and the particular as their essence. Moreover, the universal has two essences. For example, [the universal] such as cowness etc. being qualified by qualifier, and [the universal] such as Being itself and Reality itself etc. not being qualified. Among them, [the latter universal] — which has not-distinguished and single essence — is the cognitive realm of non-conceptual direct perception, i.e. the mere perception (*ālocanamātra*). The former [universal] is [the cognitive realm] of conceptual [direct perception]. The above is his explanation of definitions.

1.1.2. [Objection:] Dispute between Sumati and Kumārila³.

But **Kumārila** explains that perceptual cognition (*ālocanajñāna*) is non-conceptual and has the particular aspect of individual things as its object. On the other hand, [he explains that] conceptual

¹ In order to prove direct perception's non-conceptuality, Śāntarakṣita begins the dispute with Sumati anticipating that the reason used for negating the existence of qualifier such as genus etc. is not established. Jha[1937: 635] and Hattori[1959: 118] think that the reason is shown in TS1257-60(G), but introductory sentence in TSP463,17 states that Śāntarakṣita anticipates that the first reason is not established (prathame hetau ... asiddhatām āśaṅkate.). This kind of proof had already been done in TS1219. There, he negated the existence of genus etc. by the reason "because genus etc. are not perceptible apart from individual things". *cf.* jātyādīnām adṛṣṭatvāt tadyogāpratibhāsanāt | kṣīrodakādivac cārthe ghaṭanā ghaṭate katham || (1219) Tr: Insofar as a genus, etc., is not perceived and [— even if it did exist —] its connection [with the substratum] does not manifest itself — as, for example, in (the mixture of) milk and water, etc. — how is it possible to connect it with the object? (I follow Funayama[1992: 71, note86] about textual correction and translation.);

Moreover, Śāntarakṣita negates the existence of qualifier involved in perception in TS1256-59. *cf.* yadi vā yasya bhāvasya yadrūpasthitikāraṇam | na vidyate na tattvena sa vyavasthāpyate buddhaiḥ || (1256) avidyamānasāsnādīr yathā karko gavātmanā | viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthagrahaṇam na ca vidyate || (1257) savikalpakabhāvasya sthiter ākṣe nibandhanam | vipakṣaḥ śābaleyādīr anyathātīprasajyate || (1258) na cāprasiddhatā hetor jātyādeḥ pratiśedhataḥ | bhedenā cāparicchedān na cāsty evam viśeṣaṇam || (1259) Tr: Furthermore, if (*yadi vā!*) there is a certain entity (*yasya!*) no causal basis (*kāraṇa*) to ascertain a certain form, that (entity) is not ascertained as such by wise people [1256], as for example white horse (*karka*), where there is no dewlap, etc., (is not established) as a cow; and in direct perception (*ākṣa*) there is no cognition of an object — as a causal basis (*nibandhana*) — qualified by qualifiers for ascertaining a conceptuality (*savikalpakabhāva*) [1257-58ab]. The (cows) *śābaleya*, etc., are heterogeneous examples. Otherwise, undesirable conclusions would follow [1258cd]. Moreover, the reason is not established (*aprasiddha*) because (qualifiers) such as genus are negated (by us) and because (they are) not determined as different [from their substratum, even if it were assumed that genus etc., are real entities,] and as such, [i.e., as not thus determined,] qualifiers do not exist [1259]. (I follow Funayama[1992: 108, note262, 263] about textual correction and translation.)

² I follow the margin note of J, Pt.

³ In Jha's translation, it is not clear where is the end of Sumati and Kumārila's dispute. But if we follow the margin note of manuscripts to pronouns, we can understand that at least the dispute between them continues until TSP465,14.

direct perception has the universal as its object¹. Against this, in order to examine the direct perception — i.e. mere perception — which is accepted by Kumārila etc., Sumati says: "Those who claim such things should be asked as follows: Which is true: the object itself present in front of one's eyes is or is not grasped as qualified by its own essence which can not exist in any other thing?"

1.1.3. [Objection:] Direct perception has one of the following alternatives: It grasps the object itself or it grasps nothing.

If he [i.e. Kumārila] says that [we] never [grasp in this way], against this [Sumati] replies as follows: "If [one] does not grasp [an object] by excluding it from the other objects", this means that, since **the essence** or the own nature of the intended object does not exist in **objects other** than it i.e. in the things **excluded from it**, if the [intended] object is qualified in this way, it is considered as not being grasped. In this case, **it follows that [one] grasps the object itself or [not]**. In other words: Given the fact that **the object itself** could not be other thing and it lacks [the other's] own nature, **it follows that [one] grasps [the object] itself**. Or, in the case when it is not grasped, **it follows that [one] does not grasp anything at all or [not]** i.e. nothing is grasped at all.

"**For example in regard to the pot**" is the expression of an example and, through another śloka [i.e. 1266], [Sumati] explains it as "**from the other pots**" etc. [That is:] **If [one] does not grasp the pot by being impossible for another pots²**, in this case **it follows that [one] grasps the pot itself or [not]**. In other words, **it follows that [one] grasps the pot itself** not qualified by some qualifier such as being of silver or of copper etc. Or, even when [one] is not capable to grasp **the pot itself**, in this case **it follows that [one] does not grasp any intended [object]**. This is "**[one] does not grasp the pot**

¹ Kumārila explains in ŚV's 4th chapter that non-conceptual direct perception to individual things arises at first, then conceptual direct perception to genus etc. such as the universal and the particular arises. Cf. asti hy ālocanajñānaṃ prathamam nirvikalpakaṃ | bālamūkādīvijñānasadrśaṃ śuddhavastujam || (112) na viśeṣo na sāmānyam tadānīm anubhūyate | tayor ādhārabhūtā tu vyaktir evāvasīyate || (113) nirvikalpakabodhe 'pi dvyātmakasyāpi vastunaḥ | grahaṇam lakṣaṇākhyeyaṃ jñātrā śuddham tu grhyate || (118) na hy asādhāraṇatvena paravyāvṛtyakalpanāt | viśeṣānugamāklpteḥ sāmānyam iti nāpi tat || (119) tataḥ paraṃ punar vastu dharmair jātyādibhir yayā | buddhyāvasīyate sāpi pratyakṣatvena saṃmatā || (120) Tr: For there is indeed first a cognition of mere seeing that is non-conceptual, which is similar to the cognitions of infants and the speechless, etc., and which arises from undifferentiated object. At that time neither the universal nor the difference of the object is experienced [distinctly]; rather only the individual, which serves as the receptacle both, is ascertained. (112-113) Even in a non-conceptualized awareness there is an apprehension of a thing that has a dual nature, which is known indirectly. However, the undifferentiated object is apprehended by the knower. (118) For it is not perceived as unique, because there is no distinguishing it from others; nor as a universal, because of the absence of a conception of being common to [other] particulars. (119) The cognition, however, by which the thing is subsequently ascertained by means of properties such as its genus, etc., is also considered perception. (120) (I follow Taber[2005: 94-96] about textual correction and translation.)

² The word "*avadhikṛta*" appears in TS/TSP's 20th chapter, and is used when a Jainist proves the existence of the particular. cf. *avadhikṛta*vastubhyo vairūpyarahitaṃ yadi | tadvastu na bhaved bhinnam tebhyo 'bhedāt tadātmavat || (1716) TSP595,5-6 Tr: If [a certain entity] is devoid of dissimilarity from the other entities, the entity would not be different from them. Because there is no difference. As is the case of [the entity] itself. (I follow Wakahara[1995: 77, 90, note38] about textual correction and translation.)

at all or [not]". Similarly in the case shown by the example, if [one] does not grasp [the object] by qualification, **it follows** that [one] grasps the object itself or does not grasp it at all. This is the alternative choice.

1.2. [Objection:] The direct perception of individual things is conceptual because it has qualified object.

If the former is [Sumati's] claim, concerning it [Sumati] maintains "**the other grasped [object]**" etc.

If [sense cognition] is intended as [the direct perception] which grasps [an object] by excluding it from the other grasped [objects], it would be conceptual cognition. For example, the cognition like "[this is] a tree" etc¹. (1267)

If sense **cognition** is intended as [the direct perception] which **grasps** an object qualified by its nature impossible in the other [objects], in this case it would be **conceptual**. This is so because it grasps an object qualified by a specific essence. For example, **the cognition** like "[this is] a tree" etc.

1.3. [Objection:] The object itself which is perceived is the universal. And the universal penetrates individual things.

[Kumāri²] thinks as follows: No object itself which is grasped as being qualified by its nature exists at all. However, the qualified essence is considered by both for you and me as the particular, and it is precisely it [i.e. the particular] which exists and is grasped. Such being the case, [Sumati³] maintains that "**But the particular which has no relation to the universal does not exist at all**".

But the particular which has no relation to the universal does not exist at all. If [one] grasps [it] with no relation to that [i.e. the universal], [in fact] it would not be grasped, because [in this case, the particular] has no existence⁴. (1268)

The object itself means **the universal**, and it [i.e. the universal] is called Being itself. As capable of being grasped, **the particular** which has no relation to it [i.e. the universal] **does not exist at all**. Concerning this [point], [Sumati⁵] seems to think as follows: "In your [i.e. Kumāri's] view, even

¹ According to Śāntarakṣita, even if not being associated with verbal expression, the cognition "this is a tree" includes conceptual construction. cf. śabdārthaghaṭanāyogyā vṛkṣa ityādirūpataḥ | yā vācām aprayoge 'pi sābhlāpeva jāyate || (1214) Tr: That [cognition] which is capable of connecting a word with an object, even if the word in the form of "tree" etc. is not actually applied, appears as if it were connected with an expression. (I follow Funayama[1992: 64, 90, note53] about textual correction and translation.)

² I follow the margin note of J, Pt.

³ I follow the margin note of J, Pt.

⁴ The ontology mentioned in TS1268 seems to be the premise of the epistemology stated in TS1275.

⁵ I follow the margin note of J, Pt.

grating that **the universal** exists, it is not seized at the moment of the grasp. **If [one] grasps [it] with no relation to that [i.e. the universal], [the particular] has no existence, [in fact] it would not be grasped.**" In other words: "If at the moment of the grasp, the **universal** called Being itself is not seized by sense cognition and only the particular itself is grasped, in this case it follows that the particular itself which is grasped is devoid of the nature called Being itself, it lacks its own nature or has no own nature. The consequence is that it is not graspable by sense cognition. This is so because **[the particular] has no existence**, i.e. because [it] is devoid of nature. Just like the sky-flower¹."

1.4. [Objection:] It is concluded that the direct perception of individual things is conceptual.

It is hasty [to claim] that [sense] cognition has a qualified object, [moreover] that there is no conceptual construction [in sense cognition]. [It is] because no difference is possible apart from a connection with a qualifier. (1269)

From the above [claim], [Sumati's] conclusion is as follows: **It is hasty [to claim] that [sense] cognition has a qualified object**, moreover **that there is no conceptual construction** [in sense cognition], given the fact that you accept the invalidation by cognitive instrument. It is precisely concerning this that [Sumati] maintains his proof "**[It is] because no ... with a qualifier.**" etc. In other words: Apart from any connection with a stick, there is no possessor of it. Likewise, apart from any **connection with a qualifier**, no qualified object is possible. Therefore, if [one] grasps any **connection with a qualifier**, this kind of [grasping] is associated with conceptual construction.

The syllogism: [Thesis:] The subject of dispute, the cognition with qualified object [i.e. direct perception of individual things] is associated with conceptual construction. [Reason:] Because it has qualified object. [Example:] It is a cognition like "This is a piece of cloth." etc.

¹ In TS/TSP's 20th chapter, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla introduce a Jainist theory that things commonly have their universality, or they become non-being like sky flower (*khapuṣpa*) unless they have it. cf. **bhāvo bhāvāntarātulyaḥ khapuṣpān na viśiṣyate | (1709ab)** ... kiṃ cid vivakṣitaṃ vastu ghaṭādi, sa yadi ghaṭādir bhāvaḥ paṭādinā **bhāvāntareṇātulyaḥ** syāt, tato yadi vyāvṛttaḥ syāt, tadā **khapuṣpān na** tasya viśeṣaḥ syāt. sarvathā vastvantarād vyāvṛttatvāt. na ca vastvantarād vyāvṛttasyānyā gatiḥ sambhavati khapuṣpatāṃ muktivā. tasmāt tasya vastunaḥ khapuṣpātulyatvam abhyupagacchatā bhāvāntaratulyatvaṃ vastutvaṃ nāma sāmānyam abhyupagantavyam iti siddham sāmānyātmakatvam. TSP593,6-594,1 Tr: **If a thing is not equal to other things [at all], it would not be distinguished from sky flower [i.e. non-being]. (1709ab)** ... a thing means arbitrary certain entity, [just like] a pot etc. If this thing such as pot **is not equal to other things** such as cloth **[at all]** or [entirely] different from [other things], it would **not** be distinguished from **sky flower**. Because it is entirely different from other entities. In fact, a thing which is different from other entities has no other way but to be the sky flower. Consequently, those who admit that this entity is not the same with sky flower must admit the existence of similarity or the universal such as Reality itself. (I follow Wakahara[1995: 74-75, 90, note31] about textual correction and translation. Therefore, it is proved that [entity] has the universal as its essence.)

2.1.1. [Answer:] Direct perception grasps a particular individual thing excluded from other homogeneous and heterogeneous things.

By "**Homogeneous things**" etc., [Śāntarakṣita] replies.

[Sense] cognition is regarded as having qualified object. Not because it is associated with a qualifier, but because it grasps the object excluded from homogeneous and heterogeneous things. (1270)

Concerning the above mentioned [syllogism], if [Sumati gives] the reason as "Because it has qualified object" in the sense that it is based on the connection with a qualifier negatively related to [Buddhist's reason], in this case the reason is not established. In other words: For Buddhist, no qualifier exists; otherwise, based on the grasping of the connection with that [i.e. the qualifier], [sense] cognition would have a qualified object. Rather, because [sense] cognition grasps i.e. cognizes the object itself excluded from both homogeneous and heterogeneous things, it is regarded, i.e. it is accepted as having a qualified object.

2.1.2. [Answer:] Individual things are not qualified by a qualifier and are ineffable.

If such is the case, how this [i.e. the object] is qualified? As to the fact that the expression "this [i.e. the object] is qualified etc." has a negative [meaning], [Śāntarakṣita] states "**[nothing other than] an individual thing / distinction**" etc.

This is so because [nothing other than] an individual thing / distinction is said to be qualified, and it [i.e. the individual thing / distinction] is not associated with a qualifier. Moreover, this [i.e. the qualified object] is not considered as penetrated with the expression "it is different". (1271)

An individual thing / distinction means exclusion from both homogeneous and heterogeneous things. And that [i.e. act of exclusion] does not differ from the excluded things. In other words, precisely [that] thing is said to be [qualified] in the above way, when [one] wants to know that [i.e. the thing] itself by the exclusion of other individual things.

[Sumati] might [refute the argument] as follows: If [one] grasps a real entity different from both homogeneous and heterogeneous things, in this case the grasp is necessarily conceptual. This is so because [the grasp of a qualified object] operates in [conceptual] way such as "it is different". Otherwise, if [the grasp] operates differently [i.e. in non-conceptual way], how could it have that [i.e. real entity excluded from the other things] as its object? That is to say: Since [this involves the fault of] overextension, [non-conceptual grasp] which operates differently cannot have it as its object. Concerning the above, [Śāntarakṣita] states "**Moreover, this [i.e. the qualified object] is ... "it is different".**" etc.

2.1.3. [Answer:] After the non-conceptual direct perception, conceptual cognition associated with verbal expression arises.

If [Sumati] says "why then is it said to be different?", [Śāntarakṣita] states "**different from itself**" etc.

On the other hand, when [an individual thing] has already been grasped as distinguished from all other things which are different from itself, in regard to it there arises such a [i.e. "it is different"] conceptual construction. (1272)

When [an individual thing] has already been grasped as distinguished i.e. excluded from all those other things which are different from itself, after the manifestation of [for example] the form of unique blue [color] etc., there arises the **conceptual construction** with the verbal expression "it is different"¹, which determines the individual thing [or] distinction and which entails the form of words. But the real entity does not have verbal expression as its own nature nor is it associated with it [i.e. verbal expression] as its nature. Otherwise, unless [one] grasps it [i.e. the real entity] associated with appellations such as "different" or "not different", there would be no grasp of [the real entity]. Therefore, [your] reason ["Because it has qualified object"] is not established at all.

2.2.1. [Answer:] If non-conceptual cognition grasps the universal, it follows that it has qualified object.

If thinking that "it is qualified" is based not on the connection with the qualifier which is a factor different from [the real entity] but on exclusion, [Sumati makes clear] the meaning of the reason "Because it has qualified object", in this case too the reason is inconclusive by itself. In order to indicate the above, [Śāntarakṣita] states "**by qualifier**" etc.

Even if the universal not qualified by qualifier is accepted by the opponents and it is grasped through non-conceptual cognition, in the case of this kind of [universal] too, that fact [i.e. the fact of having qualified object] is the same as [the fact of being grasped through conceptual cognition]. (1273)

This is to say: **The universal** has two essences: there is the universal which has an essence qualified **by qualifier** and the universal which has an essence **not qualified**. Among the [two essences], **non-qualified essence is accepted** [by the opponents] **as being grasped through non-conceptual cognition**². **In the case of this kind of universal too, that fact [i.e. the fact of having qualified**

¹ In kk.729 of 13rd chapter, Śāntarakṣita explains the transition from sense cognition to conceptual cognition associated with words. There, he explains that recollection (*smṛti*) brings about conceptual cognition. Cf. ajalpākāram evādaḥ vijñānaṃ tu prajāyate | tatas tu samayābhogas tasmāt smṛtaṃ tato 'pi te || (729) Tr: At first, the cognition in a form free from verbal expression arises. The memory of verbal convention then arises. Hence, they [i.e. the notions of being etc.] are recollected. And from the fact that [conceptual cognition determines the perceived one as such], they are recollected. (729) (I follow Takenaka[1979: 41] about textual correction and translation.)

² This is Sumati's view in TSP ad TS1264-66.

object] is the same as the fact of being grasped through conceptual cognition mentioned above.

2.2.2. [Answer:] The universal is distinguished from the particular and grasped by conceptual cognition.

If [Sumati] asks why is it so, [Śāntarakṣita] states "**It is so because ... from the particular**" etc.

It is so because the universal is understood as distinguished (*viśiṣṭa*) from the particular.

Therefore, the cognition which grasps it follows that it is conceptual. (1274)

It is so because **the thing distinguished** i.e. excluded **from the particular** is understood as **the universal**. Otherwise, if it is not excluded from that [i.e. the particular], the universal would be impossible. And therefore **the cognition which grasps** this universal excluded from the particular has qualified object, so it also **follows that it is conceptual**. According to your view, however, this is not so. Consequently, [your reason "Because it has qualified object" cannot be but] inconclusive by itself.

(To be continued)

Summary:

In this way, although Sumati and Śāntarakṣita agree with the fact that individual things are excluded from the other things, they have different perspectives about the process of perceptual cognition of individual things: Sumati thinks that non-conceptual cognition grasps Being itself and conceptual cognition grasps the qualified objects including individual things. On the other hand, Śāntarakṣita thinks that non-conceptual cognition grasps a particular individual thing which is not qualified by qualifier. Therefore, Sumati and Śāntarakṣita use the word "qualified/excluded" in different meanings. In other words, Sumati considers that individual things are similar to each other in a certain respect, because of Being itself. On the contrary, Śāntarakṣita considers that each particular individual thing differs from homogeneous things and heterogeneous things.

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ŚV : Ślokavārttika, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, see NRA, Taber.

TS : Tattvasaṁgraha, Śāntarakṣita, see TSP.

TSP : (B) Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā, Kamalaśīla, Tattvasaṁgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita with the commentary 'Pañjikā' of Śrī Kamalaśīla, S.D.Shastri, Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi, 1968.

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