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Minilateralism Matters:

An Analysis of Japan's Diplomacy on Global Warming¹⁾

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Abstract

The global warming is a transnational issue by definition that no single country cannot effectively solve by itself. However, it has been ironically proved that it has been facing enormous difficulty to architect the global cooperative system meeting the challenge because it *is* transnational issue. This paper employs the concept of *multilateralism* crafted by John Gerald Ruggie to illustrate the current status of the global warming politics because global warming is too obviously collective good and cannot be a zero-sum issue. This paper assumes that complete cooperation is ultimately inevitable, but also purports to analyze current international cooperation by using Ruggie's concept of multilateralism that has shed lights on "nature of cooperation" rather than liberal institutionalism emphasizing organizational or norm structures. However, this paper then argues that his argument is still ineffective, and, therefore, this paper also utilizes the concept of minilateralism of Miles Kahler as auxiliary. In so doing, this paper can explain the status of "divided multilateralism" of global warming from the 1990s onwards.

Keywords: Global Warming, Multilateralism, Minilateralism, Japan, Diplomacy

Introduction

Global warming is a transnational issue; by definition, no one country can tackle it alone, therefore a multilateral approach is essential. It is ironic, however that there have been enormous difficulties in constructing a multilateral governance approach to global warming precisely because it *is* a transnational issue. This is far from an isolated case, as can be seen in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) talks over the last few decades. Indeed, in terms of this problem, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the NPT are quite similar.

The UNFCCC emerged out of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) that took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This was a highly political meeting, in which a new North-South conflict and serious discrepancies among the viewpoints

of advanced industrial states emerged. They clashed over the nature of the division of CO₂ emission reductions responsibility. The fundamental nature of this conflict over global warming has remained unchanged since then. Today, the primary arena where all the signatory states of the UNFCCC discuss the division of responsibility is the Conference of the Parties (COP). The COP has been held annually since COP 1 was held in Berlin in 1995, and has often been faced with critical situations. These include COP 3 in Kyoto in 1997 and COP 6 part II, which was held in Bonn in 2001, which came close to destroying the UNFCCC itself. However, signatory states somehow managed to conduct their negotiations and they ultimately arrived at the several compromises that saved the multilateral framework approach to global warming.

This willingness to compromise may well be due to the very real danger that global warming poses. In the Cold War era, environmental issues were regarded as “low politics” by national leaders while strategic-military issues were regarded as “high politics.” However, today’s international political players have blurred the boundaries between these two issues. Indeed, environment destruction has become an increasingly important security matter since the 1970s²⁾. The prioritization of environmental issues has happened in particular as the threat of a nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union has become increasingly unlikely. The collapse of this polarized system brought the confrontation of these two major political-military blocks to an end, thereby reducing the influential power of the US and the Soviet Union (later Russia) over their former allies.

With the shift of security concerns from the nuclear wars to global warming, Japan’s influence has become relatively more significant. Japan is one of the biggest CO₂ releasing states besides the United States and the European Union. Japan’s behavior is simply critical for CO₂ reduction in the global level. In terms of diplomacy, Japan’s actions would also affect how the US and the EU would conduct their diplomacy on this issue. As referred later, North, namely Japan, the US and the EU, have been criticized by South, developing countries including China, for North’s reckless industrial development for a few centuries that caused global warming at first. The success of anti-global warming measurement had been dependent upon how the three core actors would be able to coordinate their policies. In so doing, North can appeal their legitimacy on advancing anti-global warming diplomacy to South.

The question may then be posed, what kind of contribution has Japan made so far? What international efforts have been made to maintain the system of global governance? In particular, what role has Japan played during the period of the implementation of Kyoto Protocol (KP) and

its development since the US defected from it in 2001? This paper analyzes Japan's diplomatic approach to the issue of global warming, by focusing on COP 3 (1997) and COP 6 part II (2001) and by employing Ruggie's concept of *multilateralism*, and Miles Kahler's concept of minilateralism.

Theoretical Problems

Regime Theory

In most of the attempts that have assessed the influence of international governance on today's somewhat anarchical world, the concept of *regime* has often been utilized. Indeed, the Kyoto Protocol (KP) is often referred to as a global warming *regime*. According to Stephen Krasner, a regime can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations³⁾. If we follow this definition, it is clear that the KP falls perfectly within these criteria. The aim of halting global warming is explicitly present, and various institutionalized mechanisms, procedures, and even a compliance system have been built around it.

However, if we are trying to assess the nature of a particular regime, then we will need to identify its content. This means that we must know *how* each state confronts the realities of each specific policy, and how they interact with other member states within the regime.

Multilateralism

To illustrate the nature of cooperation, John Ruggie's concept of "multilateralism" is useful. Multilateralism is frequently used as a concept that is contrary to either bilateralism or unilateralism. Multilateralism denotes relations among three or more parties while bilateralism concerns relations between two states, and unilateralism represents a sole state's foreign affairs. Indeed, Robert Keohane defines multilateralism as "the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states."⁴⁾ Ruggie has criticized this notion and, instead, has proposed that while the numerical feature is a necessary condition for multilateralism, it is not a sufficient condition for multilateralism. The sufficient conditions are concerned with the principles on the basis of which the relations among states are organized⁵⁾. A multilateral world order would include rules of conduct that can equally apply to all states, as opposed to discriminating against some due to situational constraints and particularistic preferences.⁶⁾ Ruggie goes even further and suggests that such an order would also

allow for a greater degree of indivisibility among the interests of different countries than other forms of governance. This might generate two possible effects. One is that there is a greater incentive to promote interests through collective action. The other possible effect is that each state is then permitted to engage in international transactions from which they may then calculate their gains and losses. These effects are the opposite to those that emerge on the back of case-by-case bilateral reciprocity.⁷⁾

Ruggie's then argues that there can be international regimes having non-multilateral characteristics. For example, Nazi Germany's international trade system in the 1930s—the so-called Schacht Plan—was not a multilateral regime because it was based on bilateral agreements and clearing arrangements.⁸⁾ Another example of a non multilateral regime Comintern (later Cominform) that was a regime based explicitly on the principle of Marxism-Leninism.⁹⁾ On the other hand, Ruggie points out that there have been multilateral international frameworks that did not fulfill the criteria for a regime, according to Krasner's theory. These frameworks include the Concert of Europe and the British free trade system.¹⁰⁾ The aspects that make a regime *multilateral* are that behavior among three or more states is coordinated on the basis of generalized principles of conduct.¹¹⁾ In addition, Ruggie stresses the quality of the actors within each regime or international system.

Minilateralism

Theoretically speaking, it seems very likely that, as the number of involved actors increases, cooperation among them becomes more difficult to attain. Kenneth Oye notes that, as the number of participants increases, the feasibility of sanctioning declines, recognition and control problems occur, and the ability to identify common interests is also reduced.¹²⁾ Indeed, the empirical evidence demonstrates that multilateral regimes have *not* always been conducted in the multilateral mode that Ruggie depicts. Some cases have revealed that great power collaborations appear to generate or sustain multilateral regimes, as can be seen in the cases of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

According to Barry Eichengreen's historical survey, the international monetary regime since the nineteenth century has demonstrated the same pattern of collaboration among the great powers. The international monetary system has always been regarded as having come into existing "after hegemony," in the sense that more than a single dominant economic power was required to ensure the provision and maintenance of international monetary stability.¹³⁾ The US

also demonstrated little intention to carry out a downright campaign against the many remaining discriminatory exchange relationships during the first decade after 1945. Only after the mid-1950s did the IMF initiate a major attack on the four hundred bilateral exchange agreements.¹⁴⁾

In the trade regime that is run according to the multilateral principle manifested in the GATT, there have also been collaborations of great powers that limited the multilateral principle. In the immediate postwar world, particularly among great powers, bilateralism was still a predominant exchange mode. The Kennedy Round soon proved the difficulty of persuading the multilateral nations that were most favored by the US to engage in bargaining practice. Quickly, the only modes of negotiation that remained practical when negotiations were being conducted between the principal supplier of a product and its major importing nations were bilateral arrangements, or the collaboration of several powerful states. The negotiating group of key countries during the Kennedy administration was called the “bridge club.”¹⁵⁾ Concessions that were negotiated among the dominant traders were then extended to other participants. Multilateral trade negotiations became a substantial, large, and complicated series of bilateral negotiations. The main actions of each negotiation took place away from multilateral meetings. The great power hierarchy that emerged during the Kennedy Round became quite well-established during the next Tokyo Round. Gilbert Winham describes this in terms of the emergence of a pyramidal structure, where agreements were initiated by the major powers at the top, and they became gradually multilateralized as other countries were gradually included in the discussions.¹⁶⁾

These diplomatic behaviors are part of the “gray area” that exists in multilateralism. The formation of groups of key negotiating states is sometimes an effective means to further negotiations in a multilateral setting. This is because this situation allows for conflicting points to be discussed and makes concessions more attainable. As we have discussed above, multilateral regimes have sometimes been governed by cooperative structures of powerful states. Miles Khaler calls this *minilateralism*. The US uses minilateralism as a means to govern international regimes in those situations where other principal economic powers were deemed to be taking advantage of the system and were regarded as unacceptable, situations where additional legislation was required, and situations where exclusion or the threat of exclusion from the regimes was undesirable. The cost of minilateral collaboration to the US was the implementation of an institutional structure that placed some limitations on the unilateral actions of America and reduced the benefits that America got from cooperation.¹⁷⁾

To summarize, minilateralism represents the collaborative diplomatic actions of powerful states in multilateral regimes. Through its implementation, unilateralism (predominantly American) is somehow limited by other powerful states. However, negotiations towards multilateral agreements can be more effectively made. In this sense, minilateralism is not only derived from multilateralism but also is also a useful means to resolve deadlocked international negotiations within the wider multilateral framework.

Why focus on Japan's role in the COP 3 and COP 6 part II?

This paper will examine Japan's role in minilateral framework. The reason for this focus is twofold. First, Japan is a state that is responsible for major CO₂ emissions. Japan is recognized as one of the key states that are responsible for halting global warming, together with the EU and the US. Their trilateral cooperation is crucially important if CO₂ emissions are to be reduced at the global level. Second, Japan is very concerned with issues of environmental protection, and has many technologies available to help implement this protection. Japan has had a history of environmental concern that reaches back to the mid-1950s. This concern was prompted by the tragedies of mercury and cadmium poisoning that occurred in Yokkaichi and Minamata—the so-called *Kogai*—that became controversial social issues and had a significant impact on policy-makers and prompted suggestions for alternative business practices. The 1970s oil shock also provided a stimulus for Japan to become energy conscious, as it recognized its energy vulnerability.¹⁸⁾

Why focus on COP 3 and COP 6 part II? Both conferences provided critical instances where the EU, Japan, and the US were locked into a conflict that might have destroyed the multilateral framework. Japan was in a critical diplomatic position in these negotiations. As the COP 3 hosting state, it is highly likely that Japan could not help but assume the role of conflict-resolver among them. In COP 6 part II, Japan was put in a more critical situation when the US officially announced its defection from the KP. If Japan and the EU had failed to agree, then the KP itself would have ceased to be effective. It is natural to assume that Japan took major initiatives in order to be in accord with the EU. In short, both conferences provided instances where the multilateral framework approach to the issue of global warming was saved from destruction largely because of Japan's minilateral efforts.

Japan's Global Warming Diplomacy

Before COP 3

Global warming soon began to be part of the wider new North-South issue. Many developing countries, together with China, formed the “Group of 77 plus China (G77 + C)”¹⁹⁾ in the 1980s in order to further their position that global warming was entirely attributed to the reckless development by the North (the US, the EU, and Japan). G77 + C soon became a negotiator with the EU, Japan and the US.²⁰⁾

The UNCED in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 marked the first global summit meeting on global environmental issues that was hosted by a nation in the South; it came to symbolize the genuine need for multilateral cooperation. The Japanese government could not take diplomatic initiatives at the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro 1992. This was due partly to the fact that Japan was faced with a stormy political situation regarding Japanese forces' participation in the United Nations' peacekeeping Operations for the first time. Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa was unable to attend the UNCED, and Japan was the only country from the industrialized nations that did not send a national leader. Furthermore, Japan had proposed an increase of 50 percent for the environmental protection budget within its Official Development Assistance (ODA). However, since the adjustment of the conflicting views of the ministries concerned took an enormous amount of time, Japan was not able to present the new ODA plans in the early phase of the Summit. Indeed, former foreign minister Saburo Okita, who had laid the groundwork for the wise-men meeting,²¹⁾ expressed his regret that he was unable to present Japan's proactive position towards the environment.²²⁾

With the establishment of the UNFCCC in 1994, the next step of signatory states was to enact the principle of *common but different responsibilities* that had been outlined at the UNFCCC. The Conference of the Parties 1 (COP 1) was held in Berlin in 1995 precisely to discuss this implementation. The main focus of the COP 1 was to elaborate the meaning of this principle. The North was already divided into two major camps by the time of this meeting. On the one hand, the EU was proposing drastic CO₂ reductions as its ultimate goal, and proposing that individual annual targets be included in the protocol of the COP 3 of 1997. On the other hand, there was a group of non-EU developed countries, JUSSCANNZ²³⁾, namely Japan, the US, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway, and New Zealand, shared a more moderate position, and were opposed to the clear stipulation of reduction targets, and were in favor of the South's voluntary reduction of CO₂ emissions.

The COP 1 faced enormous disruption; much of the conference proceeded with all-night negotiating sessions, which went nowhere. At the heart of this disparity lay a difference in the way in which common but different responsibilities were *interpreted*. The savior of the framework was the “green paper” that was submitted by the primary developing countries except those who were members of OPEC. This paper demanded unilateral concession from the North, without which developing countries would assume any further duties, and that the signatory countries who initiated the protocol stipulate developed countries’ duties. This became the foundation document that lay behind the Berlin Mandate (BM). The Berlin Mandate outlines the protocol that requires developed countries to set reduction targets in terms of greenhouse gas, and implement green policies, and mechanisms by 1997 in order to reduce the gross amount of CO₂ emission for the year 2000 to the levels of the year 1990. The unilateral characteristics of the mandate resulted in huge indignation from developed nations, in particular the US. This became apparent in COP 6 part II (this will be discussed later).

Between the COP 1 and COP 3 (the 1997 Kyoto Conference), there were a number of conferences held. The COP 2, G8 summit meetings, and several meetings of the Ad Hoc Group for the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) were held in order to prepare for the 1997 Kyoto Conference. Negotiations after the COP 1 proceeded according to the targets outlined in the Mandate. This resulted in global warming politics entering a new phase. The fault line between the EU and the JUSSCAANS (in particular, the US) emerged over the interpretation of *common and different responsibilities*, which had been a major fault line between North and South. The EU and the US clashed over each reduction target.

On the other hand, the EU and the US initiated a bizarre cooperative stance against the G 77 + C.²⁴⁾ At the AGBM 5 meeting in December 1996, the US and the EU demanded that the G 77 + C refute the unilateral aspects of the Berlin Mandate. The G77 + C responded to this demand with a proposal emerging from a unified faction of AOSIS, G77 + C, and the OPEC at AGBM 8 in October 1997. This proposal suggested that the North was obligated to reduce their CO₂ emission by 7.5 percent in 2005, 15 percent in 2010, and 35 percent in 2025. The proposal even included the establishment of a guarantee fund for the inevitable negative effects that this reduction would have on business. As a result, the actual reduction targets were not set until the COP 3. In this phase, the countries of the South successfully avoided CO₂ emission regulation. On the other hand, they were gradually losing their influential power because, as they excluded themselves from the regulations, they were also excluded from the discussions.²⁵⁾

The COP 3: The Kyoto Conference

Japan hosted the COP 3 (the Kyoto Conference) in December 1997. The majority of the COP 3 was spent on meetings among the EU, the US, and Japan. The vast majority of those countries that made up the South merely waited for the compromises and consensus to be made. From the Japanese perspective the main aim for the COP 3 was threefold. First, the actual reduction targets must be set. Second, the target must be feasible for Japan to meet. Finally, the US must join in agreement.²⁶⁾ While pursuing these aims, Japan did not intend to advocate future emission control of the South, since the revisit of the BM would complicate the COP 3 itself. As the host state, Japan wanted to avoid any breakdown of negotiations by balancing these aims. This was an extremely difficult task for Japan, and the only viable choice was to focus on the negotiations among Japan, the US and the EU that might enable the US to remain in the framework and adopt acceptable reduction targets.

The COP 3's success was dependent upon the last three days of ministerial meetings that were conducted among Japan, the US and the EU. This was because the generation of the protocol setting reduction targets with *numbers* was the ultimate goal. Japan was determined to take the initiative and establish a great collaborative power union. Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto made a speech demanding that developed countries must reduce their CO₂ emissions to one third of their current level.²⁷⁾ The US vice president Al Gore then addressed the crowd and outlined his proposal that achievable and binding numerical goals must be set. However, Gore revealed that he had received an order from President Clinton to take a more flexible approach.²⁸⁾ Japan, the US and the EU proceeded to conduct intensive percent-to-percent negotiations.

In the beginning of the COP 3, the US proposed a zero percent reduction while the EU advocated 15 percent. On the other hand, Japan was proposing a level of 5 percent. The trilateral negotiations over numerical targets were incredibly intense.²⁹⁾ However, eventually they did generate the widely agreed reduction rates of 6 percent for Japan, 7 percent for the US, and 8 percent for the EU.

Now that there was agreement within the countries of the North, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted. While the Kyoto Protocol emerged as a product of negotiations among those countries that made up the North, the South only demonstrated its presence in COP 3 only when opposing any proposal by the North that demanded the South share responsibilities in the future. New Zealand proposed on the fifth day of the COP 3 the idea that developing countries must commit to their own emission regulations after 2014, and that the negotiations for this must be

completed by 2002. The Philippines' reaction to this was clear, "our response to this is, no, no, and no." The G77 + C also vowed not to participate in any meetings on this matter, out of principle. The South demonstrated their anger against the North attempts to share the burden before the North's numerical targets had been determined.³⁰⁾ In this sense, it can be said that, in some way, the protocol was generated out of deepened North-South decoupling.

COP 6 Part II: The Bonn Conference

After the US's official announcement of its defection from the KP in March 2001, COP 6 was resumed in Bonn, July 2001. The new administration of George W. Bush asserted that the KP was "fatally flawed." The Bush administration was concerned with the fact that 80 percent of the global population—including India and China—had not committed to reducing CO2 emission reductions and also that any CO2 reductions would harm the US economy.³¹⁾ During the period before COP part II, Japan—as the conference chair of the KP—actively attempted to convince the US to return to the KP. In April 22, the environment minister Junko Kawaguchi visited Washington DC after an informal ministerial meeting had prepared accords for COP 2 Part II in New York, April 21. Kawaguchi met the economic adviser to President Linsey, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, and Environment Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Whiteman. She conveyed Japan's concern about the US defection from the KP and demanded that the US return to the KP. She presented both statesmen with the fact that both houses of the Japanese Diet had unanimously adopted a resolution that criticized the US defection.³²⁾ Prime Minister Koizumi met President Bush at the US-Japan summit meeting that was held at Camp David on June 30. Koizumi emphasized the importance of numerical reduction targets and the other mechanisms of the KP, and he proposed that there was still time for talks to be conducted on the KP between Japan and the US before the COP 6 part II. Koizumi then insisted that the world might be saved if only the countries would work closely together and create feasible measurements.³³⁾

The EU looked upon the efforts of the Japanese with dubiety; they were entirely pessimistic about possibilities of a US return, and made up their minds to generate accords on operational details so that the KP could be implemented promptly, without the US. The EU noted Japan's simultaneous attempt to avoid a delay of KP 6 part II and to persuade the US to return to the KP. During COP 6 part II Chairman Pronk even suggested that Japan's ambiguous position endangered climate change policies.³⁴⁾

COP 6 part II began with Japan and the EU occupying totally different positions. Japan was

the subject of enormous attention in its role as a key state for ensuring the success of the meeting. This was due to the fact that, unless Japan agreed, the conditions upon which the success of the KP relies—that all advanced industrial states agree to reduce their gross emissions of CO₂ by 55 percent—would not be fulfilled.

In this negotiation, Japan took advantage of its critical position. Domestically, the Japanese government was under pressure from the business community to reduce the burden of CO₂ emission reductions by deploying the method of off-setting the balance of CO₂ through the planting of forests to absorb the CO₂, known as carbon *sink* projects. Although Japan was severely criticized by other states and environment NGOs, Japan successfully attained a 3.9 percent carbon offset through the *sink* project which achieved the gross reduction rate of 6 percent, as had been stipulated in the KP.³⁵⁾ The main subject areas for debate were the Core Elements for the Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan for Action (BAPA).³⁶⁾ In particular, the G77 plus China, the EU, and the UG debated the nature of their compliance with the KP. After several long nights of debate, it was decided that all stipulation regarding the financing covering any health damages caused by non-compliance with the KP would be deleted. Once Japan had consented to this agreement, the Core Elements for the Implementation of BAPA was approved. With this “Bonn Agreement,” the KP was saved and the substantial operationalization of the KP was achieved. The Bonn Agreement became the foundation for the Marrakech Accords that came out of the following COP 7 in 2002, in which the fully completed operational details of the compliance system were outlined.

Analysis

How can we understand Japanese diplomatic behaviors in COP 3 and COP 6 part II, in terms of multilateralism? It is safe to say that Japanese actions in COP 3 were minilateral. At COP 3, cooperation among Japan, the EU, and the US was essential for the successful generation of the KP. Since the premises of the Berlin Mandate were outlined in COP 3, compromise among the major industrial powers was crucial. To this end, in its role as the host nation, Japan conducted intensive negotiations with the EU and the US in the final phase, and successfully achieved the outlining of numerical reduction targets.

During the COP 6 part II, Japan made efforts to encourage the US to join the KP. In this sense, Japan was seeking to implement minilateral consolidation with both the US and the EU, in order to save the KP in the initial phases. However, as the defection of the US seems

unchangeable, Japan exploited the critical situation to lighten its own emission reduction burden. Although Japan's consent to compliance was critical in the final stage, Japan's exploitive actions were not merely expedient but also instrumental in defending multilateralism. Therefore, the Japanese were only partially exercising minilateralism in COP 6 Part II

Conclusion

This paper analyzed Japanese diplomacy on global warming, focusing on COP 3 and COP 6 part II. Since the ideal type of multilateral diplomatic behavior as depicted by Ruggie is difficult to identify in many unusual cases—especially in the case of global warming—Kahler's concept of minilateralism was introduced in an attempt to further illuminate Japan's diplomatic role. The FNCCC was generated in 1992, and the Berlin Mandate (BM) formed during COP 1 was then adopted as the foundation for subsequent COPs.

However, the unilateral characteristics of the BM meant that the KP had several instances where it seemed very likely that major industrial powers would withdraw from it. The COP 3 and COP 6 were typical cases. This paper attempts to illustrate Japan's diplomatic behavior at these meetings in order to assess whether Japan employed minilateral diplomatic behavior to save the multilateral framework. This paper concludes that Japan conducted its multilateral diplomacy in the way Kahler describes. However, the case of COP 3 demonstrates that Japan's behavior was based more on its hope that, as the host nation, it could ensure the conference was a success. COP 6 Part II illustrated Japan's attempt to reduce its own burden that was stipulated at the KP. In this sense, a close examination of COP 6 Part II demonstrates that Japanese actions were only partially minilateral.

Notes

- 1 This paper is originally written for presentation at the 43th Annual Conference of Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast (ASPAC) held at Soka University of America (SUA), Aliso Viejo, CA 92656 USA, June 19-21, 2009.
- 2 World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future* (London: Oxford University Press, 1987). For more than three decades, global environmental issues, including global warming, have been the focus of an enormous amount of attention among national leaders because they are increasingly viewed as security matters. Since the impact of environmental issues is

- fundamental to matters of survival, it is unsurprising that in 1974 even a military leader was already urging radical revision of views of national security suggesting that environmental factors be taken into account. See Maxwell D. Taylor, "The Legitimate Claims of National Security," *Foreign Affairs* 52 : April 1974, 594; Lester Brown also redefined security in 1977 by listing three essential elements: the aggravation of the biological system, climate change, and food shortage. See Lester R. Brown, "Redefining National Security," *Worldwatch Paper* 14 (October 1977); Barry Buzan made a similar argument in 1983 that environmental degradation caused damage to the material basis of the state. See Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Harvester Wheatsheaf: Brighton, UK, 1983), 82.
- 3 Stephen D. Krasner, ed. *International Regimes* (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2-3.
 - 4 Robert O. Keohane, "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research," *International Journal* 45 (Autumn 1990): 731. See also Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1989).
 - 5 John G. Ruggie, *Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 20.
 - 6 *Ibid.*
 - 7 *Ibid.*
 - 8 John G. Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in John G. Ruggie, ed. *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of An Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 8-9.
 - 9 *Ibid.*, 13.
 - 10 *Ibid.*, 18-22.
 - 11 *Ibid.*, 14.
 - 12 Kenneth Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy," in Kenneth Oye, ed. *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 19.
 - 13 Barry Eichengreen, "Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System," in Richard N. Cooper et. Al., eds. *Can Nations Agree?* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), 287.
 - 14 Gardner Patterson, *Discrimination in International Trade: the Policy Issues, 1945-1965* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), 54-60.
 - 15 Miles Kahler, "Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers," in John G. Ruggie, ed. *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of An Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 302.
 - 16 Gilbert r. Winham, *International Trade and the Tokyo Round* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 34, 65, 376.
 - 17 Kahler, 299, 304.

- 18 Carin Holroyd, “National Mobilization and Global Engagement: Understanding Japan’s Response to Global Climate Change Initiatives” a paper presented at the 50th Annual Convention of International Studies Association (ISA), New York, February 15, 2009.
- 19 The Group of 77 (G77) was originally named after the 77 member states that made up the group supporting the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1967. The G77 currently includes more than 130 developing countries.
- 20 However, the countries that make up the G77+C have not been of one accord. For instance, several small island states have lost their lands through rising sea levels and have formed the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). They are more sympathetic to the EU’s position recommending radical CO2 emission reductions. On the other hand, OPEC has firmly been against drastic reductions due to its fear of losing oil business.
- 21 Japan hosted its preliminary meeting in April 1992 by inviting “wise men” such as Jimmy Carter, Mikhail Gorbachev, former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yoo, former Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, Gaishi Hiraiwa (Chairman of the Federation of Economic Organizations), and Morris Strong (who had played a key role during the Rio Summit, and became Secretary General of the summit). At this meeting, a general consensus was reached between North and South on large scale financial plans for halting global warming, despite the fact that discussions of detailed amounts are still to take place. See Hiroshi Oki, Kireina Chiukyu wa Nihon Kara: Kankyo Gaiko to Kokusai Kaigi (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 2007), 66-67.
- 22 Ibid., 67-68.
- 23 This group has functioned only for exchanging information; the majority of this group have taken collective action in actual diplomatic negotiations after COP 3 (the Kyoto Conference in 1997) as the Umbrella Group (UG), which includes Iceland, Russia and Ukraine.
- 24 Takeuchi, 221.
- 25 Ibid, 222.
- 26 Oki, 92.
- 27 Ibid, 116.
- 28 Ibid, 119.
- 29 Keiji Takeuchi, Chikyu Ondanka no Seijigaku, (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1998), 206-219.
- 30 Ibid, 223.
- 31 A Letter from U.S. President George W. Bush to U.S. Senator Hegel, March 13, 2001.
- 32 Yasuo Takahashi, “Chapter 3, Beikoku no Ridatsu to Rekishiteki Goi: Bonn Goi ni Muketa Kokusai Kosho,” in Hironori Hamanaka, ed. Kyoto Giteisho o Meguru Kokusaikosho: COP 3 Iko No Kosho Keii (Tokyo: Keio Gijuku Daigaku Shuppankai, 2006), 78-81.
- 33 Ibid, 89.

34 Ibid, 91.

35 Oki, 126-127.

36 This action plan was agreed to at COP 4, 1998 and included several resolutions of some of the previously unresolved issues that had been left open at COP 3. It tackled some issues related to developing countries.

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