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An Argument for ‘Adjacency Pair’ as a Theoretical Unit of Conversation

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Abstract

This paper presents an argument to prove the theoretical status of a minimal unit of conversation called ‘adjacency pair.’ It was rejected as a theoretical unit of conversation by Searle (1992a, 1992b) and was reluctantly consented as a practice by Schegloff (1992) after a debate between them. This paper examines utterance pairs consisting of a disjunctive utterance and its preceding utterances that constitute an intended/unintended oxymoron and demonstrates how causally they are related by specifying the perlocutionary effect of the perlocutionary act concomitantly performed by the speaker of the preceding utterances.

This paper presumes that this causal relation partially or totally satisfies Searle (1992b)’s Intentional causation, which satisfies his claim such that a form of pattern is explanatory if and only if it can exemplify a rule or some other form of Intentional [*sic*] causation.

To prove these presumptions, this paper examines English scripts with oxymora and disjunctive utterances which are the translations by the present author from the original Japanese novels that explicitly reflect ordinary Japanese conversation within the framework of regulation theory proposed in Kubo (2003, 2004, 2007, 2012, 2014) that is an extension of current speech act theory.

Keywords: adjacency pair, causal relation, disjunction, Intentional causation, oxymoron, perlocutionary act, pretense

1. Introduction

As is well-known, in Conversation Analysis, ‘turn-taking’ and ‘adjacency pair’ are important notions for the description of sequence organization in interaction (see Schegloff, 2007, p.9).¹ While, in theoretical pragmatics such as speech act theory (see Searle, 1969, 1979; Searle, Kiefer, and Bierwisch, 1980; Searle and Vanderveken 1985; Vanderveken, 1990, 1996; Vanderveken and Kubo, 2002), theorists argue that these notions are not theoretical units of conversation and do not constitute the parts of the structure of conversation (see Holdcroft, 1992; Kubo, 2012; Moeschler, 1992; Roulet, 1992, for discussion). Searle (1992a) questions the intrinsic structure of conversation including ‘adjacency pair’ as well as the theory of conversation (Searle, 1992a, pp.8-11).² In addition, Searle (1992b) claims as follows:

(...) the identification of the patterns by itself explains nothing. In order to be explanatory the form of pattern must exemplify a rule or some other form of Intentional [*sic*] causation.³ In the case of the putative turn taking rule there is definitely a pattern—but where is the evidence that this is actually a rule that people follow? It is no help to be told that maybe it is not a rule but only a ‘practice’ (pp. 145-146, also see Searle, 1983; Parret and Verschueren, 1992).

In the debate between Searle and Schegloff, Schegloff (1992) reluctantly agreed that the notion is not theoretical by saying “for now we can make do with ‘practices’ instead of ‘rule’” (p.120). Vanderveken (1994, 1999, 2011) successfully constructed a theory of conversation by restricting the subset of the set of conversation. However, he does not admit as a theoretical/structured unit of conversation the level of an ‘adjacency pair’ or a ‘move’ that is larger than a single speech act and smaller than an ‘exchange’ or ‘intervention’⁴ in the structure of conversation (see Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975 for the structure of conversation/discourse).

The aim of this paper is to prove that an ‘adjacency pair’ or ‘utterance pair’ constitutes theoretically/structurally a minimal unit of conversation and to support indirectly Conversation Analysis from a Speech Act theoretic perspective.⁵ I will investigate utterance pairs consisting of different types of disjunctive utterances and their preceding regulatory/non-regulatory utterances of oxymora (see Fogel, 1993; Nelson, 1989; Watson, 1989 for the notion of ‘regulation’⁶) and show that those pairs are causally connected by the perlocutionary effects of the perlocutionary acts concomitantly performed by the speaker in performing the preceding utterances (see Davis, 1979 for the notion of perlocutions).

In this paper, I presume that the speaker of the preceding utterances of an intended/unintended oxymoron performs intentionally or unintentionally a perlocutionary act that causes a perlocutionary effect of the listener’s having an ambivalent mental state or a mental state of disequilibrium (see Piaget, 1926/1959, 1946; Flavell, 1963) and driving him/her to perform a complex disjunctive illocutionary act. I also presume that the causal relation between them partially or totally satisfies the condition of causal Intentionality Searle requires the structured unit of conversation to have. In order to prove these presumptions, this paper examines English scripts with disjunctive utterances that are the translations by the present author from the original Japanese texts extracted from Japanese novels published from 1986 till 2011 that adequately reflect ordinary Japanese conversation within the framework of regulation theory proposed in Kubo (2003, 2004, 2007, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2014).

This paper is constructed as follows. Section two will clarify disjunctive utterances as well as disjunctive propositions using set theory. The truth-value of a disjunctive proposition is calculated by the help of a truth table if the truth-values of its constituent propositions are given. While, the truth-value of a disjunctive utterance is not determined unless those of the proposition of the preceding speaker’s belief are determined. Occasionally, the preceding speaker’s pretense puzzles the listener in determining the truth-values of the disjunctions. Section three will examine cases in which the preceding speaker performs intentionally a perlocutionary act that causes a perlocutionary effect of ambivalence in the hearer’s mind and drives him/her to perform a disjunctive utterance. There, the preceding speaker’s pretense is involved in the causal chain that leads to the following speaker’s production of a disjunctive speech act. Section four, in contrast, will examine cases where the preceding speaker performs unintentionally a perlocutionary act that also causes a perlocutionary effect of ambivalence in the listener’s mind. There, no involvement of pretense is found in the causal chain that leads to the performance of a disjunctive utterance. In these section, the contrasts between the truth-values of the preceding speaker’s belief and those of his/her pretense are represented in truth tables. Section five of this paper will conclude with a hypothesis induced from this study.

2. Disjunctive utterances

This section clarifies disjunctive utterances as well as disjunctive propositions using set theory.

2.1 Disjunctive propositions

In set theory, the truth-value of an inclusive/exclusive disjunction is defined by its necessary and sufficient condition.

The truth-value of an inclusive disjunction is true if and only if the truth-value of either one of the two disjuncts is true or both disjuncts of the disjunction are true as shown in the table 1.

Table 1 The truth table of inclusive disjunction

<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>A ∨ B</u>
t	t	t
t	f	t
f	t	t
f	f	f

The truth-value of an exclusive disjunction is true if and only if the truth-value of either one of the two disjuncts of the disjunction is true as shown in the table 2.

Table 2 The truth table of exclusive disjunction

<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>A ∇ B⁷</u>
t	t	f
t	f	t
f	t	t
f	f	f

2.2 Disjunctive utterances

Unlike the truth-value of a disjunctive proposition, that of a disjunctive utterance is not determined even if the truth-value of its constituent propositions is determined. It should be noted that the truth-value of the disjunctive utterance is affected by that of the preceding utterances.

It should also be noted that the preceding utterances can be insincere. For instance, a regulatory act of pretending is devoid of its sincerity. Whenever a speaker performs that regulatory act, he/she violates the sincerity condition (or Gricean Maxim of Quality: 'Don't say what you believe to be false!') and does not speak what he/she believes to be true. Consequently, the truth-value of a disjunction is determined only if the truth-value of the preceding speaker's belief is selected and that of his/her pretense is dismissed.

From a logical point of view, the number of the possible truth-value types of disjunctions believed by the preceding speaker is three.

Type-1: The truths of both disjuncts are believed.

Type-2: The truth of either disjunct is believed.

Type-3: The truth of neither disjunct is believed.

In the following two sections, various cases under these types are examined taking the truth-values of preceding speaker's belief and/or pretense into consideration.

3. Disjunctive utterances with the preceding speaker's pretense

This section investigates three cases according to the three types mentioned in the previous section where the preceding speaker's pretense as well as his/her belief are involved in his/her performing consecutive speech acts that constitute an intended oxymoron, then they affect the performance of the following speaker's disjunctive utterance. In other words, the truth-values of the disjunctive utterances performed directly after the oxymora in are

determined only if those of the preceding speaker's beliefs are selected while those of his/her pretenses are dismissed.

3.1 Case 1

This sub-section examines the case where the speaker of the preceding utterances to a disjunctive utterance pretends as if he/she believes either one of the disjuncts of the disjunctive utterance to be true in spite of the fact that he/she believes that both disjuncts of the utterance are true.

For example, (1) is a conversation between Hyogo, a special inspector of the *Tokugawa Shogunate*, and his traveling companion, Yasu. With his first and second utterances, Hyogo seems to express consecutively his beliefs that Yasu is quick at understanding but has the habit of jumping to a conclusion even when a careful consideration is required. To be specific, Hyogo's first utterance with an adjective "hasty" that has negative implication and his second utterance with an adjective "quick" that has positive one are inconsistent each other, and constitute an oxymoron. Hearing Hyogo's oxymoron, Yasu, in puzzlement, cannot help but ask Hyogo the disjunctive question one of the disjuncts of which corresponds to one of the evaluations in order to clarify Hyogo's true intention. Namely, the 'positive evaluation' corresponds to the positive proposition, "Hyogo is complimenting Yasu," and the 'negative evaluation' to the negative one, "Hyogo is ridiculing Yasu." In reply to Yasu's disjunctive question, Hyogo answers explicitly, "Both of them." His reply makes it clear that his literal utterance expresses his pretense. There, he pretends as if he is either complimenting or ridiculing Yasu, which brings about a perlocutionary effect of puzzling him and drives him to perform a disjunctive question. This interpretation regarding the process of Yasu's utterance of a disjunctive question suggests that his utterance is ascribed to Hyogo's oxymoron.

(1) Hyogo: How am I impressed with your hasty judgment! You are quick at understanding.

Yasu: Gee, are you complimenting me, or are you ridiculing me?

Hyogo: Both of them.

(My translation of a Japanese passage from Nanjo's *Hyogo Tsukikage*)

In this connection, hearing Hyogo's reply to Yasu's disjunctive question in (1), the truth-value of the inclusive disjunction is determined to be true, after the dismissal of Hyogo's pretense and the selection of his belief. The truth table 3 shows the contrast between the truth-values of Hyogo's belief and his pretense, where the first combination and the second and third combinations of truth-values represent Hyogo's belief and his pretense, respectively.

Table 3

A	B	A ∨ B	
t	t	t	← Hyogo's belief } Hyogo's pretense
t	f	t	
f	t	t	
f	f	f	

A = Hyogo compliments Yasu. B = Hyogo ridicules Yasu.

3.2 Case 2

This sub-section investigates cases in which despite the fact that the preceding speaker believes the truth of one of the disjuncts of the disjunctive question, he/she pretends as if he/she does not believe it but believes the truth of the other disjunct.

For instance, (2) is a conversation between Goroza who is an experienced masterless samurai and Kampachi who is an advisor to the boss of a *yakuza* family or a Japanese mafia at his office.

Goroza is a tactician for his traveling companion, Ukon, who is a talented swordsman. They want to work as bodyguards at the *yakuza* family in order to earn a living. Hearing Kampachi’s suspicious comments on Ukon’s skill to his boss, Goroza notices that Kampachi is not competent enough to detect the swordsman’s skill. Then, he intentionally performs a non-literal illocutionary act of ridiculing Kampachi in pretending as if he praises him. In other words, what he says literally is inconsistent with what he believes. The writer’s disjunctive commentary in the italicized sentence clearly tells how Goroza could perlocutionarily mystify Kampachi and his boss. Therefore, the writer’s choice of the disjunctive commentary is ascribed to Goroza’s ironical utterances or an oxymoron.

(2) Kampachi (*suspiciously with a foxy face*): My boss, I know how physically powerful he is, but, I have not seen his prowess as a swordsman yet.

Goroza (*to the boss*): Oh, this brother is quite right in having such a doubt. He is indeed the advisor worthy of his boss. How thoughtful he is!

Goroza concludes his words with an oxymoron that can be understood as either a praise or an irony.

(My translation of a Japanese passage from Narumi’s *Ukon the Vagabond and His Outlaw Sword*)

Moreover, reading the writer’s commentary in (2), the truth-value of the exclusive disjunction is determined to be true, after the dismissal of Goroza’s pretense and the selection of his belief. The truth table 4 shows the relation between the truth-values of disjuncts of disjunctive assertion in the extract (2) where the second combination and the third combination of truth-values represent Goroza’s pretense and his belief, respectively.

Table 4

A	B	$A \vee B$	
t	t	f	
t	f	t	← Goroza’s pretense
f	t	t	← Goroza’s belief
f	f	f	

A = Goroza praises Kampachi.

B = Goroza ridicules Kampachi.

Similarly, (3) is a conversation between Natagoro and Ryunosuke, colleagues at the magistrate’s office, after hearing Sanai’s talk about the magistrate’s records that he has already read all pages. Natagoro firmly believes that *samurais* must be good with his sword and that any literary talent is worthless to them. In this respect, he believes that Sanai is nothing because he is not good with his sword. Despite these beliefs, Natagoro pretends as if he thinks highly of Sanai’s literary talent. There, his real intention is to dispraise sarcastically Sanai for his lack of the potential as a warrior. Thus, the inconsistency between his intention and his words constitutes an oxymoron. In the context of utterance like this, in astonishment with rage, Ryunosuke, a close friend of Sanai’s, can’t help but ask Natagoro whether he is praising or dispraising Sanai. These observations clearly tell that his selection of the disjunctive question is ascribed to Natagoro’s oxymoron.

(3) Natagoro (*with sarcastic intent*): In old saying, ‘Nobody shall be endowed with two gifts.’

Despite the fact that Sanai is no good with his sword, he is well-versed in the contents of the magistrate’s records like this. That is really something.

Ryunosuke (*accusingly*): Natagoro, are you praising Sanai, or dispraising him?

Natagoro: Of course, I'm praising him. Sanai, you know it, don't you?

Sanai did not answer to his words.

(My translation of a Japanese passage from Ueza's *The Boat I Give You a Ride*)

Incidentally, hearing Natagoro's reply to Ryunosuke's disjunctive question in (3), the truth-value of the exclusive disjunction is determined to be true, after the dismissal of Natagoro's pretense and the selection of his belief. The truth table 5 shows the relation between the truth-values of disjuncts of disjunctive question in the extract (3) where the second and the third combination of truth-values represent Natagoro's pretense and his belief, respectively.

Table 5

A	B	$A \vee B$	
t	t	f	
t	f	t	←Natagoro's pretense
f	t	t	←Natagoro's belief
f	f	f	

A= Natagoro praises Sanai. B= Natagorodispraises Sanai

3.3 Case 3

This sub-section will examine cases where the preceding speaker pretends as if he believes either one of the disjuncts of the disjunctive question to be true, despite the fact that he/she believes neither disjunct of the disjunctive question to be true.

For example, (4) is a conversation between Hachibei, the master of a rich merchant family, and Obun, a famous experienced *geisha* girl. Hachibei asked *geisha* girls including Obun to come and celebrate his father's 88th year at a high-class Japanese restaurant. Hachibei who takes good care of his father wants her to go to his father's table at once in order to have his father enjoy comfortable exchanges with Obun. For that sake, he flatters her by saying that she is a young woman. She takes his words a bit literally and responds modestly mentioning that she is not young any more. In reply to Obun's response, Hachibei adds that she is young without question from his father's viewpoint. It does not matter to Hachibei whether Obun is a young woman or not. His utterance implies that she may not be young from others' viewpoint. The inconsistency between what is said and what is implied constitutes an oxymoron. This point is confirmed by the writer's disjunctive commentary in the italicized sentence. The writer speaks in place of Obun about how perplexing for her Hachibei's words would be. In other words, the author's selection of the disjunctive commentary is ascribed to Hachibei's oxymoron.

(4) Hachibei: Lady, now that you are here, will you go and extend a warm welcome to my father?

Contrary to appearances, he loves young women.

Obun: Master, I am not a young woman any more. I am the eldest among *Geisha*-girls who are invited today.

Hachibei: From my father's view, you are a young woman without any question, I assure you.

With an unidentifiable message that is understood either praising her or dispraising her,

Hachibei urged Obun to move.

(My translation of a Japanese passage from Ueza's *Lids of Bales*)

By the way, reading the writer's commentary in (4), the truth-value of the exclusive disjunction is determined to be true, after the dismissal of Hachibei's pretense and the selection of his belief. The truth table 6

shows the relation between the truth-values of disjuncts of disjunctive assertion in the extract (4) where the second and third combinations and the fourth combination of truth-values represent Hachibei’s pretense and his belief, respectively.

Table 6

A	B	$A \vee B$
t	t	f
t	f	t
f	t	t
f	f	f

} ← Hachibei’s pretense
 } ← Hachibei’s belief

A= Hachibei is praising Obun. B= Hachibei is dispraising Obun.

Similarly, (5) is a conversation among three persons, Junsai, Mr. Kato, and Tatsugoro. Junsai is a retired lord, Mr. Kato is his major retainer, and Tatsugoro is his beloved gardener. They know each other very well through the same hobby, *senryu*-poem. Junsai believes the common faith among *samurais* that the creeds of a religious sect must be respected. In this point, he cannot help being amazed by the manners that townsmen freely interpret and exploit their religions. Based on these understandings of townsmen, he pretends as if he praises their ways of living but actually makes merry over them. To be specific, Junsai’s first conjunct, “you guys believe anything blindly according to your tastes” with negative implication and his second conjunct, “you can deal successfully with anything” with positive one are inconsistent each other, thus they constitute an oxymoron. Noticing this inconsistency, in puzzlement, Tatsugoro can’t help but ask Mr. Kato whether he is praised or dispraised by Junsai.

In this passage, Mr. Kato’s ridicule after his false assurance lets Tatsugoro realize that Junsai neither praises nor dispraises him but ridicules him. These observations clearly tell that his selection of the disjunctive question is ascribed to Junsai’s oxymoron.

- (5) Junsai: Frankly speaking, you guys believe anything blindly according to your tastes and adapt to it so readily that you can deal successfully with anything. I am deeply impressed with them.
 Tatsugoro: I am glad you like it. Mr. Kato, would you tell me if he praises me or dispraises me?
 Mr. Kato (*at once*): Of course, he praises you.
Nothing went wrong till then. But, soon, with the sound of laughter; “Mu, ha, ha, ha, ...”
Kato burst into a big laugh with his toothless mouth widely open. That caused Tatsugoro to get offended, and ...
 (My translation of a Japanese passage from Komatsu’s *Senryu-poem Warriors*)

Incidentally, observing Mr. Kato’s response to Tatsugoro’s disjunctive question in (5), the truth-value of the exclusive disjunction is determined to be true, after the dismissal of Junsai pretenses and the selection of his belief. The truth table 7 shows the relation between the truth-values of disjuncts of disjunctive question in the extract (5) where the second and third combinations and the fourth combination of truth-values represent Junsai’s pretense and his belief, respectively.

Table 7

A	B	$A \vee B$
t	t	f
t	f	t
f	t	t

} Junsai’s pretense

f	f	f
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← Junsai's belief
 A= Junsai praises Tatsugoro. B= Junsai dispraises Tatsugoro.

3.4 Discussion

Analyses given in this section clearly tell that the presumptions given at the outset of this paper are proved. Namely,

- (i) The speaker of the preceding utterances of an oxymoron performs intentionally a perlocutionary act that causes a perlocutionary effect of the listener's having an ambivalent mental state and driving him/her to perform a complex disjunctive illocutionary act.
- (ii) This causal relation totally satisfies Searle's Intentional causation and satisfies his claim such that a form of pattern is explanatory if and only if it can exemplify a rule or some other form of Intentional causation.

They also tell that preceding speakers' or the writer's selection of the disjunctive utterance is ascribed to the oxymoron.

4. Disjunctive utterances without the preceding speaker's pretense

This section will investigate three cases where unlike the preceding speaker's belief, his/her pretense is not involved in his/her performing a set of utterances that constitute an unintended oxymoron, thus it does not affect the performance of the following speaker's disjunctive utterance. In other words, the truth-values of the disjunctive utterances performed following oxymora in these cases are determined only if those of the preceding speaker's beliefs are determined.

4.1 Professional routine

(6) is a conversation between a doctor and his/her patient. The doctor, the preceding speaker, is telling the patient the result of diagnoses and his/her medical advice as a doctor. The doctor does not have any intention to make the patient worry about his/her health. Thus, the doctor's utterances are nothing to do with his/her pretense, and the truth-value of the disjunction is determined only if that of the doctor's belief is determined. His/her utterances, however, constitute unfortunately an unintended oxymoron, because being diagnosed as 'brain shrinking' is the most worrying thing, which contradicts to his second utterance saying that the patient needs not worry. Therefore, the doctor unintentionally performs a perlocutionary act of embarrassing the patient in performing an unintended oxymoron.

In consequence, the patient performs a disjunctive question that is a realization of his/her mental state of embarrassment. Therefore, his/her selection of the disjunctive utterance is ascribed to the doctor's thoughtless utterances that constitute an unintended oxymoron.

(6) Doctor: Your brain is shrinking appropriately for your age. But, you need not worry about it.

Patient: I don't know whether I need worry or need not worry about my health.

The truth table 8 shows the relation between the truth-values of disjuncts of exclusive disjunctive assertion in the extract (6) where the third combination of truth-values represents the doctor's belief.

Table 8

A	B	$A \vee B$
t	t	f
t	f	t
f	t	t
f	f	f

← The doctor’s belief

A= The patient need worry about his/her health. B= The patient need not worry about his/her health.

4.2 Innocence

(7) is a conversation between a feudal lord and his vassal. Being informed about the non-attendance of the two eminent sword masters at the sword match, the lord gives to his vassal his words that imply lucky wins by default of his vassal who plans to participate in the match. As a common practice in the feudal era, the lord expects from his vassal a brave reply such as “My Lord, I don’t mean to contradict you, but I can’t agree with you. To tell the truth, I am not lucky, sir: I would be rather happy only if I could beat those sword-masters” based upon the common faith among *samurai* warriors in the feudal times such that “*Samurai* warriors must respect prowess.” Contrary to the lord’s expectation, his vassal honestly expresses his innocent innermost thought, literally interpreting his master’s remark. Thus, his utterance is nothing to do with his pretense. This vassal’s reply constitutes an unintended oxymoron in the lord’s mind, because his being pleased with his easy victory contradicts the load’s expectation of a brave reply from his vassal.

In consequence, the lord’s dilemma as a perlocutionary effect drives him to utter a disjunctive utterance that expresses his mental state of disequilibrium. Therefore, the lord’s selection of the disjunctive impression is ascribed to his vassal’s innocence that brings about an unintended oxymoron in lord’s mind.

(7) Lord: You are lucky because those two sword-masters will not participate in the great sword match.

Vassal: My load, that is absolutely true, indeed.

Lord: I cannot tell whether I should be pleased or should feel disappointed to hear your reply.

(My translation of a Japanese passage from Saeki’s *Butterflies in Rainy Season*)

Incidentally, the truth-value of the disjunction is determined only if that of the vassal’s belief is determined. The truth table 9 shows the relation between the truth-values of disjuncts of exclusive disjunctive assertion in the extract (7) where the fourth combination of truth-values represents the vassal’s belief.

Table 9

A	B	$A \vee B$
t	t	f
t	f	t
f	t	t
f	f	f

← The vassal’s belief

A= The lord is pleased to hear his vassal’s reply. B= The lord is disappointed to hear his vassal’s reply.

4.3 Spontaneous discharge of emotions

(8) is a conversation between Heizo Hasegawa, the head of Counter-arson & Counter-burglar Agency, the Special Police Force of *Tokugawa Shogunate*, and Hikoju, his reliable aged courier. The underlined utterance, “You are my treasure” is a metaphorical overstatement with which Heizo spontaneously expresses his gratitude and relief to Hikoju. Hikoju feels that Heizo’s appreciation for him is inconsistent with what he deserves. Thus, it constitutes

an unintended oxymoron. As a result, in embarrassment, Hikoju could not help but ask a disjunctive question in order to clarify Heizo's real intention. In other words, Heizo unintentionally performs a perlocutionary act of embarrassing Hikoju that brings about a perlocutionary effect of embarrassment in Hikoju's mind. In reply to Hikoju's disjunctive question, Heizo says that he has just expressed his relief from his worrying about Hikoju's health. Thus, we have to note that Heizo's belief and intention correspond to neither disjunct of the disjunctive query Hikoju asks. Consequently, Hikoju's selection of the disjunctive question is ascribed to the unintended oxymoron that originates from Heizo's spontaneous discharge of emotions of gratitude and relief.

(8) Heizo: Hikoju, you have strong legs, to my surprise.

Hikoju: I can still beat palanquin bearers.

Heizo: I bet I know. You are my treasure.

Hikoju: He, he, he... (laughing delightedly) I can't get if you are praising me or making fun of me.

Heizo: Never mind. I just feel relieved to hear of your health.

(My translation of a Japanese passage from Ikenami's *Onihei's Crime Records*)

Incidentally, the truth-value of the disjunction is determined only if that of the Heizo's belief is determined. In the truth table 10, the relation between the truth-values of disjuncts of exclusive disjunctive remark in the extract (8) where the fourth combination of truth-values represents Heizo's belief.

Table 10

A	B	A∨B
t	t	f
t	f	t
f	t	t
f	f	f

← Heizo's belief

A = Heizo praises Hikoju. B = Heizo makes fun of Hikoju.

4.4 Discussion

Analyses given in this section clearly show that the presumptions given at the outset of this paper are proved. Namely,

- (i) The speaker of the preceding utterances of an unintended oxymoron performs unintentionally a perlocutionary act that causes a perlocutionary effect of the listener's having an ambivalent mental state and driving him/her to perform a disjunctive illocutionary act.
- (ii) This causal relation partially satisfies Searle's Intentional causation and satisfies his claim such that a form of pattern is explanatory if and only if it can exemplify a rule or some other form of Intentional causation.

They also show that preceding speakers' or the writer's selection of the disjunctive utterance is ascribed to the unintended oxymoron.

5. Concluding remarks

On the basis of the discussions in the previous sections, this paper concludes with a summary below that this research could prove the theoretical and structural status of 'adjacency pair' in conversation.

We have found the preceding utterances of an intended/unintended oxymoron are structurally and semantically conjoined with the following disjunction, because an oxymoron induces a perlocutionary act that

causes its perlocutionary effect of the listener's having an ambivalent mental state. Then, that mental state lets the listener to perform a disjunctive utterance. Looking the process of this causal chain in the reverse direction, the following speaker's or the writer's selection of a disjunctive utterance is ascribed to the preceding speaker's intended/unintended oxymoron. In other words, the combination of the utterances of an oxymoron and a disjunctive utterance satisfies the necessary and sufficient condition to constitute structurally a minimal unit of conversation.

As summarized in 3.4 and 4.4, the speaker of the preceding utterances of an intended/unintended oxymoron performs a perlocutionary act intentionally when his pretense is involved and performs unintentionally when his pretense is not involved. In the former case, the causal relation totally satisfies Searle's Intentional causation and satisfies his claim such that a form of pattern is explanatory if and only if it can exemplify a rule or some other form of Intentional causation. In the latter case, however, the causal relation only partially satisfies his Intentional causation and satisfies his claim mentioned above, because the latter causal intentionality is not to do with the speaker's unintended oxymoron but to do with the perlocutionary effect caused by his/her unintentional perlocutionary act. Namely, the second speaker confused the speaker's unintended oxymoron with the perlocutionary effect.

Footnotes

1. Schegloff (2007) explains as follows:

But a very broad range of sequences in talk-in-interaction does appear to be produced by reference to the practices of adjacency pair organization, which therefore appears to serve as a resource for sequence construction comparable to the way turn-construction units serve as a resource for *turn* construction. (p. 9)

2. For instance, Searle (1983) argues that even 'question-and-answer' pair that is understood as a typical adjacency pair does not fully satisfy the necessary and sufficient condition of 'adjacency pair,' since not all illocutionary acts of 'questioning' are satisfied with relevant illocutionary acts such as an illocutionary act of 'answering' or 'replying.'

3. Searle (1983) gives the necessary and sufficient conditions of Intentional causation (see Searle, 1982, pp.122-123). Causal relations observed in this paper satisfy these conditions of Intentional causation.

4. Vanderveken (1994) claims that "A discourse is rather to be divided into more complex *interventions* or *exchanges* which are "structured units corresponding to ordered subsequences of illocutionary acts of that discourse" (Vanderveken, 1994, p.70).

5. This is a kind of support from an *emic* study (or a study of *type*) to an *etic* study (or a study of *token*).

6. In this paper, 'regulation' means neither 'restriction' nor 'constraint,' but 'adjustment' (Fogel, 1993, p.19 for further details).

7. The set-theoretic symbol '∇' denotes exclusive disjunction.

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Source of Examples

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Appendix: Original Japanese Passages in the Japanese Novels

- (1) 「さすがは合点の安、のみ込みが早い」
「ちえっ、賞めてるんですかい、ひやかしてるんですかい」
 「その両方だ」 (南條範夫『月影兵庫 一殺多生剣』)
- (2) 「ですが、親分。この先生が、腕っ節が強いのはわかりましたが、まだ、剣の腕前は見ていませんぜ」
 狐のような顔をした勘八が、疑い深そうに言う。
 「あー、その疑念はごもっとも。さすがに代貸を任されているだけあって、そちらの兄貴は考えが深い」
五郎左は、賞賛とも皮肉ともつかぬ言い方をして、…。(鳴海 丈『さすらい右近無頼剣』)
- (3) 「天は二物を与えずとは、よく言ったものだ。剣は^なな^ちよ^こでも、左内は、これこのように裁許帖の内容に精通しておる。全く大したものだ」
 鉦^な五郎は皮肉な調子で言った。
「緑川さん、西尾さんのことを褒めているのですか。それともけなしているのですか」
 龍之介は詰る口調で訊いた。
 「むろん、おれは褒めているのよ。のう、左内」
 鉦五郎の言葉に左内は返事しなかった。 (宇江佐真理『君を乗せる舟』)
- (4) 「姐さん、せっかくですから親父の所にも行って、お愛想の一つもして下さいな。
 親父はあれで若い女が好きでして」
 八兵衛はそんなことを言った。
 「旦那、わっちはもう若くはござんせんよ。今日呼ばれた芸者衆の中では一番年増なんですよ」
 「親父から見たら姐さんは紛れもなく若い女ですって」
八兵衛はほめているのか、けなしているのか訳のわからないことを言ってお文を促した。
 (宇江佐真理『さんだらぼっち』)

- (5) 「あけすけに申すとな、おぬしらは、おのれの好むところに併せて盲信したり、せなんだり、じつに融通無碍じゃのう、と感心しているのじゃよ」
 「そりゃどうも……。加藤さん。いってえ御隠居はほめてくださったのか、腐しなすったのか、どっちなんですえ」
 「むろん褒めてくださったのだ」
 と吉之丞が即座に請け合ったまではよかったが、すぐさま、
 「むははは……」
 と齒欠けの大口を開いて笑い出したので、むっとした辰五郎は……。 (小松重男『川柳侍』)
- (7) 「そなた、お二人が明日の大試合に出られずによかったな」
 「全くもってそのとおりでございます」
 「そなたの返答を喜んで聞くべきか悲しむべきか、信直、判断がつかぬぞ」 (佐伯泰英『梅雨ノ蝶』)
- (8) 「彦十。お前は足が達者だのう」
 「まだ、駕籠かきには負けませんぜ」
 「わかった。お前は、この平蔵の宝物だよ」
 「へ、へ、……」
 うれしそうに笑った彦十が、
 「何だか、ほめておくんさるのか、からかわれているのだから、見当がつかねえ」
 「なあに、安心しているということよ」 (池波正太郎『鬼平犯科帳 (二十四)』)